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MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS, PRIVACY, AND
THE DIGITAL AUDIENCE
Alexander Tsesis*
The availability of almost limitless sets of digital information has opened a vast marketplace
of ideas. Information service providers like Facebook and Twitter provide users with an array of
personal information about products, friends, acquaintances, and strangers. While this data
enriches the lives of those who share content on the internet, it comes at the expense of privacy.
Social media companies disseminate news, advertisements, and political messages, while
also capitalizing on consumers’ private shopping, surfing, and traveling habits. Companies like
Cambridge Analytica, Amazon, and Apple rely on algorithmic programs to mash up and scrape
enormous amounts of online and otherwise available personal data to microtarget audiences. By
collecting and then processing psychometric data sets, commercial and political advertisers rely on
emotive advertisements to manipulate biases and vulnerabilities that impact audiences’ shopping
and voting habits.
The Free Speech Clause is not an absolute bar to the regulation of commercial intermediaries
who exploit private information obtained on the digital marketplace of ideas. The Commerce
Clause authorizes passage of laws to regulate internet companies that monetize intimate data
and resell it to third parties. Rather than applying strict scrutiny to such proposed regulations as
one would to pure speech, judges should rely on intermediate scrutiny to test statutes limiting the
commercial marketing of data.
Legislative reforms are needed to address the substantial economic effects of massive, commercial agglomeration of data files containing histories, daily routines, medical conditions, personal habits, and the like. To address this logarithmically expanding cyberphenomenon,
Congress should temporally restrict the retention and trade in private data. Internet
intermediaries should not be immune from such a restriction on private data storage. For such a
policy to be effective, safe harbor provisions shielding internet intermediaries should be modified
to allow for civil litigation against internet companies that refuse a data subject’s request to
remove personal information no longer needed to accomplish the transaction for which it was
originally processed.
© 2019 Alexander Tsesis. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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Our own information—from the everyday to the deeply personal—is being
weaponized . . . . These scraps of data, each one harmless enough on its own, are
carefully assembled, synthesized, traded and sold.
Taken to the extreme this process creates an enduring digital profile and lets
companies know you better than you may know yourself. Your profile is a bunch of
algorithms that serve up increasingly extreme content, pounding our harmless preferences into harm.
—Tim Cook, Apple Corp. CEO1

INTRODUCTION
One of the most complex puzzles in constitutional law is how to adjudicate cases where a commercial speaker disseminates private information in
the marketplace of ideas without the data subjects’ prior consent. This conflict has become particularly acute with the expanding online library of personal information. Internet firms rely on algorithmically powered
technologies to sift through enormous amounts of information relevant for
monitoring, retailing, convincing, or reselling. Electronic tools enable websites to aggregate consumer information, which can almost instantaneously
be commodified and linked to hundreds of thousands of additional data
points about consumer information, lifestyle habits, demographics, political
preferences, reading habits, travel routes, ambitions, illnesses, and so forth.
Internet intermediaries provide audiences with a wealth of public and
private information. They function as gatekeepers relying on well-orchestrated marketing strategies, capable of influencing consumers’ experiences,
1 Tim Cook, CEO, Apple Inc., Keynote Address at the 40th International Conference
of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners (Oct. 24, 2018), quoted in Natasha Lomas,
Apple’s Tim Cook Makes Blistering Attack on the ‘Data Industrial Complex,’ TECHCRUNCH (Oct.
24, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/10/24/apples-tim-cook-makes-blistering-attackon-the-data-industrial-complex/.
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behaviors, and thoughts.2 Commercial speech benefits corporations, and in
the internet world it benefits mostly online data providers, as opposed to
consumers.3 Much of the information they obtain through free services,
such as email or social platforms, is transmitted to commercial parties not
involved in the original electronic transaction. The data subject4 loses control of information when the internet platform transmits private facts to third
parties without the subject’s knowledge or approval. This cross-pollination of
information directs consumer experiences and political exposure to paid
advertisements that can algorithmically profile and target audiences.5 Even
extortionists have found compromising information, such as arrest photographs located on police and news websites, helpful for shaking down subjects.6 Online intermediaries substantially impact consumer privacy, civic
information, and even personal reputations. Marketing in profiles creates
opportunities and risks. Internet intermediaries channel information, making it easier to navigate the internet. But users’ privacy is compromised when
data brokers refuse to divulge to consumers all the online third parties with
whom they exchange profiles.
This Article argues that massive retention of personal information poses
a substantial harm to the privacy interests of data subjects. Congress should
rely on its Commerce Clause authority to regulate internet intermediaries’
sales of commercial data. Social media companies enjoy trillions of dollars in
profits, having a substantial enough effect on interstate commerce to require
federal initiative to control the sale, resale, and analysis of personal informa2 CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 147
(2016) (“Internet companies vie to achieve platform status, so that they have a monopoly
over the user experience, and thus can monetize and control it.”).
3 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143,
158 (2010) (“While the case was litigated by consumer protection advocates and others
seeking to lower drug prices by lowering information costs, corporate speakers soon
became the principal beneficiaries of subsequent rulings . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see also
Julie E. Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1119, 1120 (2015);
Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery & Threatening the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian
Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389 (2017).
4 For the definition of data subject, I am borrowing from the European General Data
Protection Regulation. Commission Regulation 2016/679 of Apr. 27, 2016, On the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of such Data, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 33 [hereinafter GDPR] (“‘[P]ersonal data’
means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in
particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location
data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological,
genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.”).
5 See Paul Lewis, ‘Utterly Horrifying’: Ex-Facebook Insider Says Covert Data Harvesting Was
Routine, GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/20/
facebook-data-cambridge-analytica-sandy-parakilas.
6 Samantha Schmidt, Owners of Mugshots.com Accused of Extortion: They Attempted ‘to
Profit off of Someone Else’s Humiliation,’ CHI. TRIB. (May 18, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-mugshot-website-owners-extortion-20180518-story.html.
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tion tendered for specific digital transactions. The First Amendment does
not protect online data collectors, and U.S. law should be modified to establish civil causes of action for publishing defamatory and knowingly misleading information. My focus is on commercial transactions. Thus, the
suggested regulations do not apply to natural, private persons processing
data. Cyberbusinesses profit from data retention, resale, and algorithmic
profiling. Consumer protection laws prohibiting the nonconsensual manipulation of processed personal data are in order in such a marketing scheme.
Reliance on psychometrics about such characteristics as socioeconomic
backgrounds benefits marketers.7 Commercial entities regularly hire specialists to harvest messages, user histories, purchases, social media uses, and
other data points useful in identifying idiosyncratic behaviors. An audience’s
right to information and a subject’s right to privacy often clash. The marketplace of commerce is not the same thing as the marketplace of ideas.
In the United States, the Supreme Court tends to favor an audience’s
right to access, receive, and obtain information,8 but it recognizes that com7 d3con, Cambridge Analytica Explains How the Trump Campaign Worked, YOUTUBE (May
12, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bB2BJjMNXpA. Psychometrics are data
measurements used in advertising for targeted campaigns. Madeline Ford, What is Psychometrics?, MOTIVEMETRICS (June 19, 2013), http://blog.motivemetrics.com/What-is-psychometrics. These databases of marketing information include such measures as the data
subject’s openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability.
PAUL KLINE, THE NEW PSYCHOMETRICS: SCIENCE, PSYCHOLOGY AND MEASUREMENT 24 (1998)
(“[P]sychometrics is the measurement of psychological traits and characteristics . . . .”);
Maria Gester, Psychometric Advertising in Social Media, MARIAGESTER (Feb. 21, 2017), http://
mariagester.se/2017/02/21/psychometric-advertising-in-social-media/.
8 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (“Underlying the
First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the common understanding that ‘a
major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs.’” (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (ruling that “decisions involving corporations in the
business of communication or entertainment are based not only on the role of the First
Amendment in fostering individual self-expression but also on its role in affording the
public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas”); Red
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (discussing audience’s right to access
“social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences”); Lamont v. Postmaster
Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307–10 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring) (asserting that addressees of
mail can challenge seizure); Thomas I. Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment,
15 GA. L. REV. 795, 807–08 (1981); David S. Han, The Mechanics of First Amendment Audience
Analysis, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1647 (2014).
On the other hand, in some democracies, such as New Zealand and Australia, the
right to “seek, receive, and impart information,” opinions, or ideas is not a judicial creation
but explicitly protected by statutes. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. New Zealand does not have a written constitution. Instead, various laws, such as the Bill of Rights,
function as statutory provisions, without the higher law function of the U.S. Constitution.
Michael Principe, The New Zealand Bill of Rights: A Step Towards the Canadian and American
Examples or a Continuation of Parliamentary Supremacy?, 6 FLA. J. INT’L L. 135, 136 (1990).
Similarly, section 16(2) of the Australian Human Rights Act of 2004 states: “Everyone has
the right to freedom of expression. This right includes the freedom to seek, receive and
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mercial communication is of a lower First Amendment value than philosophical, artistic, and scientific expressions.9 What is more, defamation, which is
not uncommon in the digital marketplace, has no value in the quest for
truth. Without effective consumer privacy laws, a data subject seeking to
remove defamatory statements or videos is at the mercy of companies’
opaque review processes. On the internet, the troublesome material can be
viewed thousands (even millions) of times.10 In this Article, my interest is
not a philosophical concept of privacy, but more narrowly the principles relevant to consumer privacy protections in the digital realm. Under those circumstances, regulation of commercial digital speech is a substantial
government interest that might be narrowly tailored to safeguard details
about a person’s sexuality, finances, address, and health.
Resolution of audience/privacy conflicts is critical in a marketplace saturated with digital technologies providing invaluable information at the cost
of capturing personal details about users. Five companies dominate the digital realm: Amazon, Apple, Alphabet, Facebook, and Microsoft.11 Each speimpart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of borders, whether orally, in writing
or in print, by way of art, or in another way chosen by him or her.” Human Rights Act 2004
(Cth) s 16(2) (Austl.).
9 It is important to note here a recent potential shift in the Court’s reasoning. Some
scholars argue that in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., the Court shifted to a content-based
approach to commercial speech. 564 U.S. 552 (2011); Paula Lauren Gibson, Does the First
Amendment Immunize Google’s Search Engine Search Results from Government Antitrust Scrutiny?,
23 COMPETITION 125, 136 (2014); Hunter B. Thomson, Note, Whither Central Hudson?
Commercial Speech in the Wake of Sorrell v. IMS Health, 47 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 171,
173 (2013). Their confusion comes from the majority’s review in Sorrell of something akin
to viewpoint discrimination analysis. “[The law at issue] goes even beyond mere content
discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination.” Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 565 (quoting R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)). Whatever the trend, for now, the Sorrell Court
made clear it was sticking with intermediate scrutiny. Specifically, the majority asserted
that restrictions on commercial speech cannot be sustained unless they “directly
advance[ ] a substantial governmental interest and that the measure is drawn to achieve
that interest.” Id. at 572.
10 One example is a video falsely accusing Broward County Sheriff Scott Israel of heinous acts, including rape. Even though Israel’s accuser later denounced the claim, admitting that she was paid to make the false video, YouTube refused to take the data off its
platform. Marc Caputo, ‘Oh My God . . . It’s Fake’: Far Right Falls for Hoax About Broward
County Sheriff, POLITICO (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/23/
florida-school-shooting-sheriff-hoax-482170.
11 See Andy Greenberg, How One of Apple’s Key Privacy Safeguards Falls Short, WIRED
(Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/apple-differential-privacy-shortcomings/;
Lawsuit Accuses Google of Stealing Data of 5m UK Users, PHYS.ORG (Nov. 30, 2017), https://
phys.org/news/2017-11-lawsuit-accuses-google-5m-uk.html; Shannon Liao, Google Admits It
Tracked User Location Data Even When the Setting Was Turned Off, VERGE (Nov. 21, 2017),
https://www.theverge.com/2017/11/21/16684818/google-location-tracking-cell-towerdata-android-os-firebase-privacy; Natasha Lomas, A Closer Look at the Capabilities and Risks of
iPhone X Face Mapping, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 4, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/11/
04/a-closer-look-at-the-capabilities-and-risks-of-iphone-x-face-mapping/; Farhad Manjoo,
Tech’s Frightful Five: They’ve Got Us, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
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cializes in the development and manipulation of technologies designed to
provide data to targeted audiences while tracking details about everything
from people’s employment history, to their race, police records, gender, sexual preference, addictions, and anything else that will help to algorithmically
improve marketing. Benefitting from customers’ personal data and reselling
does not fit the traditional marketplace of ideas model; rather, it is a commercial scheme to profit corporations, not natural persons. To listen to the
former Google CEO, Eric Schmidt, one would think social media forums are
altruistic entities gathering public and intimate portraits of online users to
best benefit their audiences:
With your permission you give us more information about you, about your
friends, and we can improve the quality of our searches. We don’t need you
to type at all. We know where you are. We know where you’ve been. We
can more or less know what you’re thinking about.12

In the name of improving product quality and delivery, Schmidt apparently thinks marketing can be done by all-knowing corporations providing
commercial services. But the practice of corporate officers automatically
destroying their email on their own servers and other account holders’
inboxes demonstrates that Facebook and others know full well the value of
privacy but provide customers with fewer safeguards than they rely on.13

2017/05/10/technology/techs-frightful-five-theyve-got-us.html; Jack Morse, Apple’s
TrueDepth Camera Will Be Used to Send Face Data to Third Parties, MASHABLE (Nov. 2, 2017),
https://mashable.com/2017/11/02/apple-iphonex-faceid-truedepth-privacy-ad-tracking/
#TrKpmLeRHsqu; Mike Sands, Customer Data Is the Secret to Silicon Valley’s Success, FORBES
(Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikesands1/2017/11/29/customer-datais-the-secret-to-silicon-valleys-success/#19fc551a6c3b; Nick Statt, Amazon Will Let Alexa Developers Use Voice Recognition to Personalize Apps, VERGE (Nov 28, 2017), https://www.theverge
.com/2017/11/28/16711134/amazon-alexa-echo-voice-recognition-developers-personalize-apps; Mark van Rijmenam, How Amazon Is Leveraging Big Data, DATAFLOQ (Jan. 23,
2013), https://datafloq.com/read/amazon-leveraging-big-data/517; Tom Warren,
Microsoft Finally Reveals What Data Windows 10 Really Collects, VERGE (Apr. 5, 2017), https://
www.theverge.com/2017/4/5/15188636/microsoft-windows-10-data-collection-documentsprivacy-concerns; Robert Williams, Apple Shares Facial Recognition Data with Apps, Sparking
Privacy Worries, MOBILE MARKETER (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.mobilemarketer.com/
news/apple-shares-facial-recognition-data-with-apps-sparking-privacy-worries/512048/.
12 ADAM HODGKIN, FOLLOWING SEARLE ON TWITTER: HOW WORDS CREATE DIGITAL INSTITUTIONS 185 (2017) (quoting Eric Schmidt, former CEO of Google).
13 Facebook’s founder Mark Zuckerberg is laughing to the bank about people’s gullibility of giving him monetizable, personally identifiable information. “In 2010, Silicon
Alley Insider . . . published now-infamous instant messages from a 19-year-old Zuckerberg
to a friend shortly after starting The Facebook in 2004. ‘yea so if you ever need info about
anyone at harvard . . . just ask . . . i have over 4000 emails, pictures, addresses, sns’ Zuckerberg wrote to a friend. ‘what!? how’d you manage that one?’ they asked. ‘people just
submitted it . . [.] i don’t know why . . . they “trust me” . . . dumb fucks’ Zuckerberg
explained.” Josh Constine, Facebook Retracted Zuckerberg’s Messages from Recipients’ Inboxes,
TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 5, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/05/zuckerberg-deletedmessages/.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-4\NDL403.txt

unknown

Seq: 7

5-JUN-19

9:37

2019] m a r k e t p l a c e o f i d e a s , p r i v a c y & t h e d i g i t a l a u d i e n c e 1591

Facebook’s mission statement14 similarly presents a company seeking to benefit consumers, and it is truly a remarkable platform for bringing family,
friends, and strangers together. It has the ability to spread cultural richness
of immense importance to the spread of political and commercial ideas. But
consumers rarely understand how extensively social media companies share
personal data with third parties without data subjects’ consent. Social media
terms-of-service contracts typically ask the public to surrender all their data
for analysis and resale, but the language is typically hidden in the midst of
documents full of legalese.15 These can be understood by lawyers, but for
the general public, the terms of service are ambiguous, uncertain, and can be
unilaterally modified. A Berlin court agreed with the plaintiff’s claim that,
“Facebook hides default settings that are not privacy-friendly in its privacy
center and does not provide sufficient information about it when users register.”16 Google can indefinitely retain personal information, including video,
audio, purchases, and activity on third-party sites using that company’s services.17 Even newspapers like the New York Times sell to and purchase from
third parties such data subject details as demographics, including “age, sex,
household income,” and similar metrics.18 The newspaper uses the information both to isolate personality traits to determine content preferences and to
anonymize data to conduct largescale studies.19 While digital advertisement
superficially resembles traditional marketing, the two are significantly differ14 “Facebook’s mission is to give people the power to build community and bring the
world closer together.” FAQs: What is Facebook’s Mission Statement?, FACEBOOK: INVESTOR
RELATIONS, https://investor.fb.com/resources/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
15 Andrew D. Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 643, 697
(2013) (“[E]vidence suggests that many users of Facebook do not understand how their
privacy settings work in practice.”); Mark Daniel Langer, Note, Rebuilding Bridges: Addressing the Problems of Historic Cell Site Location Information, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 955, 970 n.118
(2014) (reporting that “when Google and Facebook updated their privacy policies in 2012,
a survey found that the changes to the policies were too confusing for customers to understand”); Alison C. Storella, Note, It’s Selfie-Evident: Spectrums of Alienability and Copyrighted
Content on Social Media, 94 B.U. L. REV. 2045, 2080 (2014) (stating, based on studies, that
“many users simply do not know or understand how social media privacy settings work”).
16 German Court Finds Facebook Guilty of Privacy Violations, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Feb. 12,
2018), https://www.dw.com/en/german-court-finds-facebook-guilty-of-privacy-violations/
a-42553867; see also Facebook Broke German Privacy Laws, Court Rules, BBC NEWS (Feb. 12,
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-43035968 (explaining that the German
court found Facebook’s preclick policy to be insufficient for providing consumers notice).
Privacy statements from private corporations, like Facebook, to newspapers, like the New
York Times, allow social media companies to gather large swaths of information, including
age, sex, household income, job industry, and job title. See Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://
www.facebook.com/policy.php (last visited July 2018).
17 Google Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, https://policies.google.com/privacy?hl=en#infocol
lect (last visited July 2018) (listing information Google collects).
18 Privacy Policy § 1.B, N.Y. TIMES, https://help.nytimes.com/hc/en-us/articles/11501
4892108-Privacy-policy#1 (last updated May 24, 2018).
19 Id. § 2.
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ent because the latter is able to capture data users’ profiles, not only inform
them with useful information.
With precious few regulations in the United States governing their business strategies, internet intermediaries monetize user profiles by capturing
private data information through tracking digital tools and artificial intelligence. Personalized data points are monetized either by direct marketing or
sales to digital third parties. Without legal guidelines, social media companies use opt-in options for controlling, retaining, and exchanging private
information. Facebook has been a master of exploiting such data: a tech
journalist found that by creating an account, she activated numerous public
settings:
[H]ere’s everything that was public or turned on by default: My friends list.
My profile, which could be indexed by search engines. I could be tagged in
any post, even if I hadn’t reviewed it first. The site would suggest that my
friends tag me in images. Ad targeting would let Facebook sell marketers
the ability to find me based on my relationship status, employer, job title,
education and interests. And Facebook would use my app and browser activity to decide which ads to show me.20

Without clearly consenting to the spread of data, and without even
knowing who is receiving them, the user’s profile is commodified. Social
media companies are not covered by privacy rules, such as those that apply to
healthcare organizations under Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.21 A consumer seeking ideas in the marketplace should enjoy
greater autonomy to consent about their choice of services, rather than give
up virtually their entire bundle of privacy to curious audiences. The European Union relies on opt-in automation, while in the United States the
default option is opt-out. The latter puts the onus on consumers, rather than
exercising an interstate plan of fair dealing and consumer protections.
While the Supreme Court tends to favor speakers’ rights to explore
ideas, no provision of the Constitution provides a hierarchy of preferences
when a natural data subject has privacy interests that are detached from the
typical online data providers’ business model. As against the subjects’ right
to maintain control over private matters, corporate purpose is chiefly profit
from sales to third parties of data bits saturated with personal information
that is digitized and algorithmically analyzed.22 In those circumstances, judg20 Staci D. Kramer, Facebook Could Easily Make Privacy the Default. It Still Hasn’t, WASH.
POST (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/
04/11/i-tested-facebooks-privacy-settings-theyre-worse-than-zuckerberg-says/?utm_term=
.fb00dc199237.
21 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2018); Lori Andrews, A New Privacy Paradigm in the Age
of Apps, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 421, 434, 441–43 (2018).
22 I am thinking of the penumbral privacies such as it is established in Griswold v.
Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In that decision, Justice Douglas demonstrates that there
is a privacy that is the backbone of several constitutional provisions, including the First
Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and Ninth Amendment. Id. at 484. More recent cases,
such as Roe v. Wade, ground privacy in Fourteenth Amendment doctrine. 410 U.S. 113,
153 (1973). But the Court has never outright overturned Justice Douglas’s penumbral
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ment must be contextual and balanced without deviating from the singularity
of speech as a transmitter of information and privacy as a dignitary interest.
Both speech and privacy are protected constitutional interests, and in combination they advance individual and social concerns. Both speech and privacy
are crucial to the exercise of personal autonomy and the enjoyment of privileges common to all members of a representative democracy.23 Personal
autonomy involves meaningful commercial and political choices. Privacy and
speech are separate topics, but in the digital world articulating their connection is important for deciding when regulatory restrictions on speech benefit
the general welfare by preserving private integrity.
The First Amendment protects both speakers’ abilities to spread ideas24
and audiences’ access to information.25 Neither the rights of a speaker nor
those of an audience are unlimited entitlements,26 but both the right of
expression and the right to acquire information are tied to the Amendment’s
overall function to protect the people’s articulation of political messages, personal expressions, and scientific or artistic participation.27 Quite often information sought by one segment of the audience is guarded by individuals who
want it out of the public eye.
This Article argues that, in cases where audience rights and privacy
rights conflict, only a holistic constitutional analysis can explain why some
forms of content—copyright28 and antitrust laws,29 as just two examples—are
not protected by the First Amendment: judges should not limit themselves to
the needs of the marketplace of ideas. In today’s linked world, privacy needs
analysis in Griswold. I hope, dear reader, that you will understand that in an article of this
length I am unable to expostulate on this admittedly controversial point of view.
23 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 124–33
(2004) (discussing “privacy in terms of ‘contextual integrity’”).
24 Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 541–42 (1980) (“Where a
single speaker communicates to many listeners, the First Amendment does not permit the
government to prohibit speech as intrusive unless the ‘captive’ audience cannot avoid
objectionable speech.”).
25 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 567 (1980)
(asserting that “the suppression of advertising reduces the information available for consumer decisions and thereby defeats the purpose of the First Amendment”).
26 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (“It has generally been held
that the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special
access to information not available to the public generally.”).
27 Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1015, 1027–42.
28 Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302 (2012).
29 See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration
of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004) (“Little case law and not
much more commentary explain why the content-based restrictions of speech in the Securities Act of 1933, the Sherman Antitrust Act, the National Labor Relations Act, the Uniform Commercial Code, the law of fraud, conspiracy law, the law of evidence, and
countless other areas of statutory and common law do not, at the least, present serious First
Amendment issues.”); Melanie K. Nelson, Comment, The Anticompetitive Effects of Anti-Abortion Protest, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 327, 363.
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often conflict with the profitmaking interests of social media audiences.30
Digital transactions should be tested by evaluating speakers’ interests, consumer protections, regulatory fit to policies, precision in drafting, and relevant doctrines.
The Court’s treatment of audiences’ interests varies depending on context. In cases of political campaign expenditures, which serve to inform listeners, regulations are subject to “the exacting scrutiny applicable to
limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression.”31 However, only rational basis review applies when government authorities prohibit
the dissemination of information in cases of insider trading32 or blackmailing.33 Intermediate balancing continues to govern commercial transactions.
Where controversies involve more than one constitutional value, the judiciary
should weigh evidence tending to support a hearer’s demand for information and countervailing concerns about matters like intellectual property,
financial markets, consumer privacy, and national security. In addition,
courts should protect interests of data subjects to maintain control of their
online records against the corporate uses of digital data no longer needed
for the purpose for which it was originally generated.
Given the commercial magnitude of the secretive corporate sales of
data,34 the judiciary can only provide part of the solution. Congress should
pass a statute pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority. It should also
modify the safe harbor provision of the Communications Decency Act,
allowing for civil liability of social media platforms that facilitate the dissemination of false and deceptive marketing. In addition, new statutory limitations should be placed on the length of retention and the clandestine
commercial dissemination of consumer information.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I introduces the First Amendment’s
protections of the marketplace of ideas. Special attention is given to commercial speech doctrine. Part II looks at the erosion of privacy as a result of
internet companies harvesting enormous data sets to create psychometric
profiles. Profits are thereby gained, affecting interstate commerce with nominal benefits to the marketplace of ideas. Part III, then, discusses the delicate
balance between an audience’s right to gain beneficial information and an
30 Gregory P. Magarian, Forward into the Past: Speech Intermediaries in the Television and
Internet Ages, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 237, 251 (2018) (“In contrast to the Television Age, . . . the
new speech intermediaries’ profitmaking function dominates their social-structuring
function.”).
31 McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 197 (2014) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
44–45 (1976) (per curiam)).
32 SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 664 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the imposition of the
maximum civil penalty for insider trading was not a violation of the First Amendment);
Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Governance Speech and the First Amendment, 43
U. KAN. L. REV. 163, 202 (1994).
33 Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535 (M.D. Fla. 1991);
C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 60–65 (1989).
34 See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015).
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individual’s right to control personal data. It argues that consumer protections are necessary where commercial entities harvest personal data for commercial purposes. However, in cases challenging restraints on political
advertisements, courts should require a higher burden of proof to better
smoke out censorship. Part IV proposes regulatory reforms to limit the duration for which internet intermediaries can retain and market personal data.
It argues that social media firms should not be immune from litigation when
they knowingly spread false commercial or political information.
I. AUDIENCES

AND

DIGITAL COMMERCIALIZATION

Digital audiences’ right to access information available in the marketplace of ideas often conflicts with a subject’s right to privacy. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, the Court asserted: “In this sphere of collision between
claims of privacy and those of the free press, the interests on both sides are
plainly rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our society.”35
Audience-based protections are of paramount importance in disseminating
“social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences.”36 The
Supreme Court first recognized a First Amendment audience right to receive
information in 1965.37 The freedom to speak implies the right to have free
and equal access to ideas and information.38 Audience access to information
is key to the very purpose of the First Amendment—to protect the free flow
of opinions and ideologies. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized audiences’ right to access in matters as diverse as investigative journalism of trials39 and controversial political literature.40 So too, in the campaign
financing area, the Court has articulated audiences’ right to obtain useful
information for arriving at political decisions.
Political, personal, or informational messages have constitutional meaning, in part, because of their semantic or emotive value to an audience. But
audience rights are not absolute. Not all materials advance the marketplace
of ideas’ quest for truth; in particular, as the Supreme Court has recognized,
when data are compiled from multiple sources, they are likely to contain
mistakes and misrepresentations.41
35 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
36 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
37 Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965); see also John C. Jeffries, Jr., Damages for Constitutional Violations: The Relation of Risk to Injury in Constitutional Torts, 75 VA. L.
REV. 1461, 1479 (1989) (listing early right-to-receive-information cases); Burt Neuborne &
Steven R. Shapiro, The Nylon Curtain: American’s National Border and the Free Flow of Ideas, 26
WM. & MARY L. REV. 719, 719 n.139 (1985) (same).
38 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“[T]he Constitution protects the right
to receive information and ideas.”).
39 See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
40 See Lamont, 381 U.S. at 305.
41 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
752, 780 (1989).
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Human interactions in the digital age involve the spread of personal
information through computer platforms, such as phones with cameras. Digital conversations, be they through emails or blogs, often trigger targeted
marketing in addition to interactions in ideas and a quest for truth. Advertisers embed hyperlinks to give customers the option to connect directly to websites selling products. In addition, corporations adopt a system allowing
users to hit a button to demonstrate a visitor’s “likes.” The number of those
favorable ratings is then aggregated. Value is obtained by marketing content
to targets who have been algorithmically determined to have a commercial
desire to receive and act upon the electromagnetically transmitted material.
So-called “friends” are conduits for firms to engage in targeted advertisements, not in some discussion of political or aesthetic values. The most egregious use of this material was Cambridge Analytica’s heist of politically
manipulable data in the 2016 election.
The implications to consumer privacy are particularly acute in the digital
realm. Unlike traditional communicative media, microtechnology allows
businesses to indefinitely store private information obtained from direct
transactions and third-party dealings.42 It is unclear the extent to which this
gets us to the “truth,” as Justice Holmes’s marketplace of ideas analogy would
have it. Algorithmically obtained information is disseminated based on models created via artificial intelligence outcomes. Tidbits of information are
then tagged to create computer profiles based on algorithmic models. Social
media companies keep track of people through internet service provider
addresses, data acquired through sales, public records, listservs, sharing websites, and so forth. Social media companies invest in technology to boost
their profits; any marketplace of ideas advancement from extraction and
manipulation of private information is presumed, but no law requires them
to prove the likelihood of social or personal benefits. The firms’ plans are to
paint comprehensive user profiles based on a lifetime of information—to
include travel location, commercial preferences, intellectual attributes, racial
characteristics, etc.—that can be resold to third-party vendors.43 As I will
elaborate in Part II of this Article, the business strategy of social media networks is to indefinitely retain personal data, not simply to inform the public
or individuals of any truth. This commercial intercourse can be regulated
because it has a substantial effect on the national economy.

42 See, e.g., Thomson Reuters Privacy Statement, THOMSON REUTERS, https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en/privacy-statement.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). The Thomson
Reuters privacy agreement empowers the corporation to store a wealth of highly personal
biometric and psychometric data about its clients, including Westlaw users. Id.; see supra
notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
43 For a description of how Internet Protocol addresses are used for transmissions and
computer identification, see Alexander Tsesis, Hate in Cyberspace: Regulating Hate Speech on
the Internet, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 817, 828–29 (2001); Wei-erh Chen, Note, Optimizing
Online Trademark Protections Given the Proliferation of Generic Top Level Domains, 38 J. CORP. L.
585, 587–88 (2013).
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The commercial speech doctrine is predicated on the audience’s right
to know.44 However, much online marketing seeks not to inform but to
profit by taking “advantage of consumers’ cognitive weaknesses and biases.”45
Supreme Court precedents in this area have repeatedly conceived the protection of audiences’ access to information to be critical for making good commercial decisions and selecting between advertised products.46 But where
messages aim to influence consumers without appealing to their cognitive,
rational faculties, it provides de minimis benefit to the marketplace of
ideas.47
Social media corporations reap profits by marketing profiles to firms
engaged in commercial and political activities. To understand the role of
internet marketing it is important to describe the free speech values of advertising. By “commercial speech,” the Supreme Court refers to “expression
related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience”48 or
“speech proposing a commercial transaction.”49 What is more, commercial
speech is valuable for consumer choice and the efficient functioning of a
capitalist economy.50 The commercial nature of advertisements to gain profits distinguishes it from protected explorations of ideas, facts, philosophies,
and tastes. Manipulative advertisements are even further afield of protected
speech, appealing to emotive responses. The Court therefore only relies on
intermediate scrutiny to review restrictions on commercial statements “commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the
realm of noncommercial expression.”51 More recently, however, the Court
has become increasingly less deferential—some might say increasingly
44 Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Commentary, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128
HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 170 (2015).
45 Micah L. Berman, Manipulative Marketing and the First Amendment, 103 GEO. L.J. 497,
522 (2015); see also id. at 500 (“Many common advertising techniques do not rely on communicating information, as the Court’s commercial speech cases assume that all advertising does. Instead, they seek to influence consumers at a subconscious or emotional
level.”).
46 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 496–500 (1996); Cent. Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561–63 (1980).
47 Much advertising is emotive; for example, using sexual attraction to sell products.
See KENT GREENFIELD, THE MYTH OF CHOICE: PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A WORLD OF LIMITS 59 (2011). Even political advertisement can be emotive, drawing on nationalism, racialism, and class identity. The aim of such advertisement is to mislead and obfuscate. It does
not fit the Court’s principal justification for constitutional protection of free speech, “the
value to consumers of the information such speech provides.” Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
48 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 561.
49 Id. at 562 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)).
50 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
763–64 (1976).
51 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456.
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Lochnerian52—to consumer protection statutes that limit corporate
communications.53
While commercial entities benefit from advertising, the Court has
explained that a principal value of commercial speech is to enable consumers to receive an array of information.54 But nothing requires the speech to
be exclusively informative or advancing of truth. An advertisement that
endorses, encourages, or enthuses is equally protected, even though it does
not fit literally into the Court’s informational definition. The Court’s examination of whether speech is “commercial [in] character” requires judges to
examine content, especially when it is “inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech.”55 In such situations, the Court uses intermediate scrutiny,56 despite some indication that it might soon move to a more
rigorous test in the commercial speech area.57 There is a possibility that
“[r]egulation of a solicitation”58 might “intertwine[ ] with informative and
perhaps persuasive speech.”59 Where audible and visual elements are used
to encourage commercial transactions, accuracy is critical to consumers. Misinformation can significantly compromise a buyer’s ability to act autonomously as a rational being (in the Aristotelian sense).
The First Amendment safeguards the public’s demand for commercial
speech to evaluate commodities, and that information is only helpful when it
is authentic and truthful. Therefore, false and misleading commercial
speech has never been protected and is outside the purview of First Amendment doctrine.60 Consumers can be victimized by inaccurate devices that
lead them to make harmful consumer choices.61 However, in noncommercial settings, fallacy stated without seeking monetary return is protected.62
What is important here, as Jack Balkin has pointed out, is the social relation
between the communication and the listener. The commercial speech doc52 Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without
Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 109–16 (1993). For arguments that protection of
commercial speech revivified Lochner-era intrusions into legislative economic prerogatives,
see Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process
and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 8, 40 (1979).
53 Alexander Tsesis, The Categorical Free Speech Doctrine and Contextualization, 65 EMORY
L.J. 495, 522 n.169 (2015).
54 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
55 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988).
56 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
57 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
58 Riley, 487 U.S. at 796.
59 Id. (quoting Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632
(1980)).
60 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
61 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771–72, 771 n.24 (1976).
62 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 718–19 (2012); Helen Norton, Lies and the
Constitution, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 161.
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trine safeguards the right of marketplace consumers of ideas to acquire adequate information to evaluate risks, benefits, and preferences.63
Scholars have given various rationales for the protection of commercial
speech, but they coalesce around the audience purposes of communicating
information that provides truthful details about products and their manufacturers, distributors, or sellers. The visionary scholar on this subject, Martin
Redish, has since the early 1970s defended the value of commercial speech
on the basis of personal “self-development and self-determination.”64 Commercial speech, as Redish argues, is as empowering as any other form of
speech, and treating it differently from other expressions protected by the
First Amendment is a form of viewpoint discrimination, which the government is prohibited from undertaking.65
That perspective is controversial, and rejected by authors like Robert
Post, who believe deliberative democracy is at the core of the First Amendment’s protection of free speech. The Court has itself stated that advancing
commercial views holds a “subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values” worthy of only “limited measure of protection.”66 Post opposes
conflating libertarian notions of speech with deliberative democracy,67
although he of course recognizes that modern democracies “must regard
their citizens, insofar as they engage in public discourse, as equal and autonomous persons.”68 This leads Post to the illustrative conclusion that seeking
“to sell toothpaste” should be regarded differently from communicating and
influencing “the formation of democratic public opinion.”69 His analogy
resembles then-Justice Rehnquist’s, in a dissent, to the effect that the First
Amendment concerns “public decisionmaking as to political, social, and
other public issues, rather than the decision of a particular individual as to
63 Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1183, 1214–16 (2016).
64 Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight
Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 81 (2007) [hereinafter Redish,
Commercial Speech]. See generally Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971).
65 See Redish, Commercial Speech, supra note 64, at 107.
66 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (“[W]e . . . have afforded
commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate
position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation that
might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.”).
Like Post, other scholars attribute a similarly lower view to speech for which the principal or predominant purpose is profit. Frederick Schauer, for instance, writes: “If freedom
of speech is based on the interests of the speaker, and if the speaker’s dignity or selfrespect is the determinative factor, there seems little reason to extend that freedom to
those whose only motive is profit.” FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL
ENQUIRY 159 (1982).
67 Robert C. Post, Viewpoint Discrimination and Commercial Speech, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
169, 175 (2007).
68 Robert Post, Democracy and Equality, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 24, 28
(2006).
69 Post, supra note 67, at 177.
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whether to purchase one or another kind of shampoo.”70 Post nevertheless
concedes that it is legitimate to regard commercial speech as an element of
information distribution: “Commercial speech does, however, circulate information to the public sphere within which democratic public opinion is
formed, and this information might well be relevant to the formation of public opinion.”71 But he does not regard it as having the same First Amendment value as democratic expression.
I would take Post’s argument a step further. The First Amendment protects the right of individuals to obtain and circulate information as equal
players in a polity whose structure and substantive protections are meant to
benefit ordinary people. The First Amendment protects our private and public communicative personalities. To paraphrase Shakespeare’s As You Like It,
all the world is a stage and each of us in his or her time plays many parts. Just
as any other cases arising under the First Amendment, challenges to commercial speech regulations require careful analysis of the full context in
which statements are made. The Court’s decision to treat commercial
speech differently from core political speech is content rich.
In the digital age, commercial speech often conflicts with private sensitivities. When private data is commodified without the data subject’s consent, privacy should be treated like other commercial speech, under the fourpart test from Central Hudson. That is, the question for adjudication is
whether the speech giving rise to privacy intrusion is lawful or misleading,
whether the government has a substantial interest in the privacy regulation,
whether the regulation advances important privacy concerns, and whether it
“is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”72 Advertisements can be informative, but in today’s digital climate, businesses, especially
social media companies, are increasingly relying on the digital methods to
sweep up personal information into their databanks without obtaining consumers’ explicit permission to do so. Internet intermediaries’ privacy statements are often written in such broad language as to license indefinite
retention and almost unimpeded commercial exchange in data with third
parties.73 Social media companies also modify their privacy settings without
informing users to reconsider their acceptance of terms.74 The European
Commissioner for Justice, Consumers, and Gender Equality, Vera Jourová,
issued a statement calling for swift sanctions against Facebook, which like
other internet intermediaries, continues to issue “misleading terms of ser70 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 787
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
71 Post, supra note 67, at 177.
72 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
73 Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 GEO.
L.J. 115, 150 (2017) (“The FTC’s assumed premise is that an imagined reasonable consumer read a privacy statement and agreed to the terms in it as well as other aspects of a
consumer’s impressions of the company’s privacy representations. . . . The deceptive
merchant, then, flouted this reasonable individual’s consent. In reality, most consumers
do not read privacy policies and are unaware of company’s data policies.”).
74 PASQUALE, supra note 34, at 53, 144–45.
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vices” that confuse consumers by obfuscating that its principal corporate purpose is profit.75 Marketing strategies use the informational model to
convince buyers to provide them with a panoply of information that is then
stored in databases and sold to a slew of unrevealed third parties or affiliated
companies and entities.
II. EROSION

OF

PRIVACY

Audiences benefit from the wealth of information available on the
internet. It is a vast repository containing everything from movies and blogs,
to philosophy, medicine, mathematics, law, and engineering, to art and classical studies. Yet it is also a network, where many consumers lack knowledge
about how to protect personal data.76 Digital firms should be required to
obtain explicit consent before reselling data information about natural persons. In Europe, privacy is a recognized fundamental right and its enjoyment
is significant to the “well-being of individuals.”77 U.S. privacy law, on the
other hand, is a patchwork of state-by-state and area-specific federal regulations as well as common-law torts.78 Greater consumer protections are necessary given the ability of internet firms to gather limitless psychometric details.
Many new gadgets are connected to the internet through operating systems installed in home devices, a marketing strategy collectively known as the
75 Commissioner Jourová Met with Tech Companies to Push for Full Compliance with EU Consumer Rules, REPRÉSENTATION AU LUXEMBOURG (Sept. 20. 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/luxembourg/news/commissioner-jourov%C3%A1-met-tech-companies-push-full-complianceeu-consumer-rules_fr (quoting Commissioner Jourová).
76 See Peter Swire, Social Networks, Privacy, and Freedom of Association: Data Protection vs.
Data Empowerment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1371, 1404 (2012); see supra note 15 and accompanying
text.
77 Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Directive 95/46/
EC].
78 See, e.g., Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2012); Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012) (requiring consumer credit reporting agencies to respect consumers’ privacy rights); Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of
1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012); Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1801 (2012); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522
(2012); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012) (prohibiting various forms of consumer information compromise by internet and other service providers); Video Privacy Protection Act of
1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012); Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2721–2725 (2012); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26
U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) (protecting against wrongful disclosure of consumers’
private health information); 26 U.S.C § 6103 (2012) (requiring protection of consumer
privacy in tax returns); Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2012); 47
U.S.C. § 230 (2012); Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521–573
(2012) (requiring protection of cable subscriber privacy).
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Internet of Things.79 Household items can now gather psychometrics. Brokers’ trade secrets make it impossible for data subjects to trace where that
information is disseminated and to whom it has been traded.80 The inherent
biases based on corporate profit in internet search results are undetectable
because the algorithms firms have developed are trade secrets.81 Those
secrets only make sense when they improve firms’ ability to deliver accurate
information to listeners. While internet firms seek to keep their dealings
private, they retain unlimited data about their users. Internet-monitoring
devices are installed into cell phones, appliances, baby monitoring devices,
toasters, ovens, lamps, banks, utilities, security devices, and so on.82 Appliances with tracking devices gather metrics about the consumer and provide
digital marketing companies a huge resource for future advertising and analytics. Much of this deals with commercial transactions, not any effort to get
at the truthful information to which Justice Holmes referred to as the marketplace of ideas. Since the dawn of the internet, the default of U.S. internet
companies has been to assume that they can make business use of all data
acquired because of the opt-out presumption of data protection. This protocol provides inadequate consent about the use of psychometrics like sex,
race, gender, sexual orientation, religion, political affiliation, and the like.
Data obtained through wired household items can easily be shared because
digital companies store it in cloud servers, external to users’ physical computers and controls. Emphasis in the United States has been on connectivity
with inadequate policy concern placed on privacy and security, allowing for
information to be gathered and resold to an unknown number of third-party
vendors.83
79 See Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation of ‘The Internet of Things,’ FORBES (May 13,
2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanationinternet-things-that-anyone-can-understand/; see also Laura DeNardis & Mark Raymond,
The Internet of Things as a Global Policy Frontier, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 475, 482 (2017)
(describing how the Internet of Things raises privacy concerns of corporate and governmental information gathering).
80 See Lara Grow & Nathaniel Grow, Protecting Big Data in the Big Leagues: Trade Secrets in
Professional Sports, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1567, 1570 (2017) (“[M]ethods of data analysis
are most commonly protected under the law of trade secrecy . . . .”); Grant Arnow, Note,
Apple Watch-Ing You: Why Wearable Technology Should Be Federally Regulated, 49 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 607, 614 (2016) (“Much of . . . ‘big data’ . . . is collected without consumer awareness
and is sold for a variety of commercial purposes.”); Meglena Kuneva, Consumer Comm’r,
European Comm’n, Speech at the Lisbon Council Event: A Blueprint for Consumer Policy
in Europe: Making Markets Work with and for People (Nov. 5, 2009), http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_SPEECH-09-515_en.htm (stating that the “collection of personal and
behaviour data” through technology “is currently being done on an unprecedented
scale[,] on a massive scale[,] and mostly without any user awareness at all”).
81 See Urs Gasser, Regulating Search Engines: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 8 YALE J.L.
& TECH. 201, 232–33 (2006).
82 See Andrew Meola, What Is the Internet of Things (IoT)? Meaning & Definition, BUS.
INSIDER (May 10, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/internet-of-things-definition.
83 See Stacy-Ann Elvy, Paying for Privacy and the Personal Data Economy, 117 COLUM. L.
REV. 1369, 1379 (2017).
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Individuals wishing to link with others freely divulge their own secrets—
be they financial or health—through internet intermediaries. While individuals might want to communicate only with a specific or general audience of
natural people, corporations are the big gainers of marketing revenue. Commercial advertisers’ for-profit aims often feed off consumers’ and voters’ raw
emotions, racial or national identities, shopping preferences, party affiliations, and any other metrics they can gather online.84 The national economic effect on interstate commerce warrants passage of consumer
protection laws requiring consent and limiting the length for which data brokers can retain private consumer information.
The third-party doctrine restricts data subjects’ control over information
they have divulged to other parties, be they banks85 or telephone companies.86 A subject who uploads information on an interactive internet site
exposes himself to the machinations of commercial entities, selling the
details to law enforcement agents. Prior to 2018, the third-party doctrine did
not require law enforcement agents to get a Fourth Amendment warrant to
obtain data that had been divulged to a commercial entity.87 Data voluntarily tendered to internet companies had been subject to only a police subpoena.88 After the 2017 Supreme Court term, however, state power has been
somewhat curtailed. The third-party doctrine, nevertheless, continues to
define the extent to which consumers have reasonable expectations that
third parties secure financial and caller information. This doctrine created
an end run around for law enforcement agencies circumventing the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirements. It continues to limit data subjects’ retention of exclusive power to consent to whom private information, especially
banking and telephone records, can be sold.
In 2018, the Supreme Court limited the reach of the third-party doctrine. In Carpenter v. United States, the Court held that the Fourth Amend84 See Yoav Hammer, Expressions Which Preclude Rational Processing: The Case for Regulating Non-Informational Advertisements, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 435, 437 (2005); Tamara R. Piety,
“Merchants of Discontent”: An Exploration of the Psychology of Advertising, Addiction, and the Implications for Commercial Speech, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 377, 406 (2001).
85 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976).
86 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741, 743–44 (1979); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (finding that rebroadcast of a matter of public importance did
not violate wiretap laws prohibition, where defendants played no role in the initial, illegal
interception).
87 For an article written at a time when Smith gave key insight into internet communications, see Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine Should
Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013) (“Because Internet communications are also voluntarily disclosed to machines in the form of ISPs, arguably under Smith users appear to lose
any Fourth Amendment protection in these communications. The government would
therefore be constitutionally free to acquire these communications from the third-party
service provider without first obtaining a warrant, and to use the information against a
person at trial.” (footnote omitted)).
88 See Kimberly N. Brown, Anonymity, Faceprints, and the Constitution, 21 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 409, 443 (2014); Christine S. Scott-Hayward et al., Does Privacy Require Secrecy? Societal
Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19, 21 (2015).
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ment requires a state to get a search warrant before gaining access to seven
days’ worth of cell phone site data that law enforcement agents had used for
a criminal investigation.89 “Allowing government access to cell-site records
contravenes that expectation [of privacy],” as the Court put it, because it
“provides an all-encompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts.”90 The
Court was keenly conscious of evidence that “seismic shifts in digital technology” required some limit on government’s ability to clearly surveil an individual to so great an extent as to breach his “reasonable expectation of privacy
in the whole of his physical movements.”91 As Chief Justice Roberts continued for the majority, wireless carriers “are not your typical witnesses. Unlike
the nosy neighbor who keeps an eye on comings and goings, they are ever
alert, and their memory is nearly infallible.”92
Carpenter thereby significantly limited the reach of the third-party doctrine. Whereas before, challenges to voluntary conveyance of data from a
third party to law enforcement required no Fourth Amendment analysis,93
after Carpenter voluntary disclosures “reduce[ ] expectation[s] of privacy in
information knowingly shared with another” but do not eliminate it.94 The
Court contextually analyzed how voluntarily provided data that was used to
trace nearly all of an individual’s whereabouts for days was distinct from that
which a customer divulged to a bank or telephone company. In the words of
the majority, “[t]here is a world of difference between the limited types of
personal information addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive
chronicle of location information casually collected by wireless carriers
today.”95 Virtually ubiquitous internet monitoring is very different from
single-business record keeping of customer transactions.
Despite Carpenter’s benefits to personal privacy against law enforcement
infringements, social media companies’ transmissions from one private company to another are unaffected by that case because the Fourth Amendment
applies only to state actors.96 So, private third-party transactions remain
open to infinite commercial trades in personal data. The right of audiences
to access information, therefore, affects subjects beyond the realm of law
enforcement, where the Fourth Amendment is relevant.
Social media companies profit by selling user profiles, revealing everything from the users’ intimate relations to their sex and race.97 Consumers
reveal information in the first place expecting benefit—socially, professionally, recreationally, and so on—and indeed targeted ads help them do just
89 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
90 Id. at 2217.
91 Id. at 2219.
92 Id.
93 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 442 (1976).
94 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
95 Id.
96 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
97 Nicole A. Ozer, Facebook Not as Private as You Might Think, ACLU N. CAL. (Aug. 28,
2007), https://www.aclunc.org/blog/facebook-not-private-you-might-think.
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that. But the content is not always of interest to the consumer. Regardless,
advertisers pay data brokers whether or not a third-party sale is consummated.98 Distribution of commercially valuable data to third parties is routinely done without notice to data subjects. Third-party brokers—be they
book sellers, toy companies, political parties, or an infinite number of other
internet information companies involved in trading data—artificially obtain
global permission from data subjects by using privacy statements allowing
them to sell the data to anyone. Notice is typically hidden in legal agreements of service, difficult to understand even for experts. Data subjects are
given no transparency about data firms’ marketing strategies for sharing or
otherwise analyzing personal information.99 Companies seek endorsements
in the forms of likes and shares that are not meant to spread factual information but rather are strategic marketing, the contours and nuances of which
are hidden beneath layers of proprietary protections.100
On the other hand, data brokers and their operating officers seek to
keep their own informational privacy, in such matters as trade secrets, while
harvesting consumer information. Augmenting their ability to profile, social
media companies also purchase other companies’ records. For instance,
Facebook tracks nearly 30,000 demographic facts, most of which come
directly from its platform and others from other data brokers.101
Web-based businesses share a wealth of information with other entities,
purportedly in the interest of consumers and audiences, without maintaining
transparent policies for providing consumers with autonomous control of
information.102 Google searches “deep packet” content of emails and
thereby extracts intimate information to use in advertisements and other
profitable endeavors.103 Running sophisticated algorithms enables the com98 See Jury Demand, Hines v. Openfeint, Inc., 2011 WL 2471471 (N.D. Cal. June 22,
2011) (No. CV113084) (alleging “victims of privacy violations, and unfair and deceptive
business wherein their privacy and security rights were violated” in a class action lawsuit);
In re Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1373 (J.P.M.L. 2011)
(consolidating six causes of action of alleged victims of “improper business practices [that]
violated users’ privacy by using and sharing plaintiffs’ data without authorization”).
99 See ‘Act Now, Apologize Later’: Will Users ‘Friend’ Facebook’s Latest Intrusion on Privacy?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (May 12, 2010), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/
act-now-apologize-later-will-users-friend-facebooks-latest-intrusion-on-privacy/.
100 Vauhini Vara, Facebook’s Targeted Ads Expand to the Web, NEW YORKER (Sept. 30, 2014),
https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/facebook-targeted-ads-raise-new-privacyquestions.
101 Alexandra Burlacu, Facebook Knows a Lot About Your Offline Habits, Buying Third-Party
Data to Serve Better Targeted Ads, TECH TIMES (Dec. 31, 2016), https://www.techtimes.com/
articles/190902/20161231/facebook-knows-a-lot-about-your-offline-habits-buying-thirdparty-data-to-serve-better-targeted-ads.htm.
102 See Dustin D. Berger, Balancing Consumer Privacy with Behavioral Targeting, 27 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 3, 22 (2011).
103 M. Ryan Calo, Essay, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1152 (2011).
There is yet no indication that Google has undertaken to desist from deep packet searches;
what is more, without regulations even if the firm claimed to do so there would be no way
to double-check. What is needed is a reporting regime for internet intermediaries compa-
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pany to then send a plethora of related and unrelated materials to the data
subject. This has a substantial enough effect on interstate commerce to justify congressional action to better secure personal consumer information.
The user is not treated as an autonomous agent but one on whom advertising
content can be assigned through computer models. Internet gatekeeping
companies, such as Facebook and Alphabet, provide free associational and
informational products in exchange for personalized information, making it
possible to both electronically deliver them and to thereby acquire advertising revenue. Moreover, the beneficiaries of that data are not only commercial entities: Russia found Facebook and Twitter platforms amenable to its
quest of manipulating the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and another company used data available on online platforms to monitor “protest groups and
marketed that data to police departments.”104
Consumers often do not share the interests of commercial data brokers.
The Obama administration published a report finding that “when data collected online is combined with data derived from the real world . . . it can
cause many kinds of harms, including intrusion into private life, reputational
damage, and discrimination against individuals and groups.”105 Of eighty
participants in one study, the Pew Research Center found a common frustration of being unable to find out what information internet companies were
collecting and what they were sharing with third parties. A revealing comment sums it up: “In my opinion, there is a woeful lack of disclosure on how
personal information is used by companies. If you read some of the terms of
service, you are essentially giving the company the right to do almost anything with your personal information.”106
Monitoring tools include Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, cookies, deep
packet searches, geolocational technologies, facial recognition processing,
and surveillance technologies.107 As Paul Ohm has pointed out, even if bits
rable to the one that exists in the securities area. There are reasons to be skeptical of
Google’s claim because of its past misleading statements on privacy. For example, the
Google corporation misleadingly told users that by turning off the “Location History” function on their Android phones, they would not be tracked, but Google did not divulge that
background apps, used by the operating system, continue to track data subjects’ whereabouts. Google Records Your Location Even When You Tell It Not To, GUARDIAN (Aug. 13, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/aug/13/google-location-trackingandroid-iphone-mobile.
104 Roger McNamee, How Facebook and Google Threaten Public Health—and Democracy,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 11, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/11/
facebook-google-public-health-democracy.
105 This report is discussed in Jeff Fox, 85% of Online Consumers Oppose Internet Ad Tracking, Consumer Reports Finds, CONSUMER REP., https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/
2014/05/most-consumers-oppose-internet-ad-tracking/index.htm (last updated May 27,
2014).
106 LEE RAINIE & MAEVE DUGGAN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., PRIVACY AND INFORMATION SHARING 7 (2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2016/01/PI_
2016.01.14_Privacy-and-Info-Sharing_FINAL.pdf.
107 See Toby Mendel et al., UNESCO, GLOBAL SURVEY ON INTERNET PRIVACY AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 39–49 (2012).
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of explicit identifications—such as name and address—can be removed from
online sources, they can later be deanonymized by triangulating indirect user
information, such as zip code, birth date, and sex.108 But the amount of
information users divulge goes further. On social networks such as
Facebook, Twitter, and Snapchat, users reveal details about their families,
love interests, addresses, bosses and employers, political voices, reading preferences, sexual exploits and orientations, health, and infinitely more that
allows companies to develop accurate personal portraits. While data subjects
often voluntarily post such information on social media sites, none of them
can know to whom that information will be sold.109
As an example of the intrusiveness involved, Google developed a program for sifting the content of its Gmail service to later convert it into
targeted advertisements.110 Consent was weakly obtained through an
overgeneralized privacy statement that did not provide consumers with adequate commercial information about what information the email service was
scraping from private emails. Here stringent regulatory privacy standards
against deep packet data mining would be in order. Google uses algorithms
that are protected by trade secrets to aggregate user information.111 This
makes it impossible to obtain adequate disclosure from firms of how they
store, disseminate, and market data.112 Google’s advanced software and
algorithms further enable it to gather private information through its Google
Chrome browser, which can even record keystrokes entered into the address
bar.113 There are means for reducing the amount of information available to
Google, such as disconnecting from the Google Account while searching, but
108 Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1719 (2010). For other studies indicating the ease with which
research can deanonymize user data using a minimum number of data points from a single
or a combination of social media platforms, see Sheera Frenkel, Scholars Have Data on Millions of Facebook Users. Who’s Guarding It?, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes
.com/2018/05/06/technology/facebook-information-data-sets-academics.html.
109 See Frenkel, supra note 108.
110 See JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: HOW GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES
OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 194 (2005). Google announced in 2017 that
it was phasing out its targeted ads through Gmail, but it will continue to engage in email
scanning and recording the content of users’ searches, thus continuing to mine personal
communications. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Will No Longer Scan Gmail for Ad Targeting,
N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/technology/gmail-ads
.html.
111 Editorial, The Google Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2010), https://www.nytimes
.com/2010/07/15/opinion/15thu3.html?_r=5.
112 Google and smaller companies like techUK defend the secretive nature of their
businesses by arguing that transparency would make their systems more susceptible to
hacking and “gaming.” See Rebecca Hill, Transparent Algorithms? Here’s Why That’s a Bad
Idea, Google Tells MPs, REGISTER (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/11/
07/google_on_commons_algorithm_inquiry/.
113 Preston Gralla, Chrome: Google’s Biggest Threat to Your Privacy, COMPUTERWORLD
(Sept. 4, 2008) https://www.computerworld.com/article/2480353/internet/chrome—
google-s-biggest-threat-to-your-privacy.html.
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the default setting synchronizes Chrome activities with that identifiable
account.114
Through its trove of personal information, a social media company can
harness personal information to contribute to public discourse, and thereby
benefit an audience interested in products or politics. However, the information is not simply a matter of objective fact, as one might expect in an ideal
marketplace of ideas, where some form of truth would be the aim.
Facebook has tested the limits of users’ trust (or perhaps “gullibility”
should be the word) by overtly asking for explicit nude photographs, supposedly only to tag the photo to allow the company to prevent others from posting revenge porn with their images.115 But such a scheme has built-in
dangers. Persons might become less wary about posting such videos and
photos in the first place, with a plethora of other platforms where they can be
posted even if Facebook’s platform is not compromised. In addition, hackers
could access the images during the transmission from the subjects through
internet service providers and onto Facebook.116 Furthermore, explicit data
of sexual organs that the subject would identify might be stolen by Facebook
employees. Some regulation of how such data is stored is necessary for consumers to know their data is not abused. Security risks also call for national
standards on data storage.
Such a breach of security occurred in other contexts, such as when
Google blamed a rogue employee for stealing passwords that the company
had acquired clandestinely through software on cars used for the Google
Maps project.117 The company later revealed others knew that personal
information was being stolen, showing the lie in the earlier press release.118
Furthermore, companies like Equifax have lost data in the past and been
unable to account for its later dissemination, unable even to say whether it
was pilfered by nefarious organizations or individuals.119
114 Chris Hoffman, How to Optimize Google Chrome for Maximum Privacy, HOW-TO GEEK
(July 12, 2017), https://www.howtogeek.com/100361/how-to-optimize-google-chrome-formaximum-privacy/.
115 See Brett Molina, Facebook Wants Nude Photos from Australian Users—for a Good Reason,
USA TODAY (Nov. 8, 2017), https://eu.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/11/08/
facebook-tests-fighting-revenge-porn-asking-users-file-nude-photos-first/843364001/.
116 See Anthony Cuthbertson, Why Does Facebook Want Your Nude Photos?, NEWSWEEK
(Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.newsweek.com/why-does-facebook-nude-photos-revengeporn-705078; Liz Posner, Facebook Users Must Decide If They Trust the Social Media Network with
Their Nude Selfies, SALON (Nov. 10, 2017) https://www.salon.com/2017/11/10/facebookusers-must-decide-if-they-trust-the-social-media-network-with-their-nude-selfies_partner/.
117 Emily Anne Epstein & Rob Waugh, Google Engineers Knew for Two Years That the Company’s Street View Cars Were Stealing Emails and Passwords via Wi-fi, DAILY MAIL (May 1, 2012),
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2137145/Google-KNEW-harvestingemails-passwords-Street-View-drive.html.
118 Id.
119 See, e.g., Brian Feldman, So What Happens With All That Equifax Data?, N.Y. MAG.:
INTELLIGENCER (Sept. 8, 2017), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/09/so-what-happens-with-all-that-equifax-data.html; Barry Schwartz, Google Says It Lost 20 Days of Data of New
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Amazon’s key service is a further attempt to operationalize a strategy of
socializing people to trust online companies with our most intimate information.120 This one allows the company to deliver not only material products,
such as clothes, but also a host of informational materials, including books
and CDs. With the key service, Amazon seeks access not just into people’s
buying habits but into their physical homes. This, along with Amazon’s Echo
devices and Alexa voice, operated internet services are part of the company’s
strategy of connecting virtually every aspect of people’s lives through the
Internet of Things. With Amazon’s key service the lock is connected with a
cloud camera monitoring the comings and goings of individuals, allowing the
home owner to review recorded images but also providing space for Amazon
or a hacker to watch the inside of the premises.121 With this much power
being controlled by private firms it is critical for government to step in and
create neutral standards for the protection of privacy in a manner designed
through the Central Hudson standard, protecting speech and weighing countervailing policy that advances important privacy concerns and is no more
extensive than is necessary to serve that end.
III. BALANCING AUDIENCE INTERESTS

AND

PRIVACY CONCERNS

On the one hand, the internet facilitates the spread of ideas; on the
other, the same marketing operations affect privacy by the indefinite retention and transaction in personal data. In many cases the more a person
knows the better decisions can be made. Firms use that to their advantage
through targeted commercial and political advertisements. The internet
poses privacy concerns with commercial surveillance not covered by the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement for searches and
seizures.122
The commercial nature of internet business requires judicial oversight, a
balancing of concerns for speech and privacy. This is the approach taken in
Google Search Console Users, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (July 12, 2017) https://searchengineland
.com/google-lost-data-new-google-search-console-users-278708.
120 Selena Larson, Amazon Key Asks Users to Trade Privacy for Convenience, CNN (Oct. 26,
2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/10/26/technology/business/amazon-key-privacyissue/index.html.
121 Id.
122 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014) (“In the absence of a warrant, a search
is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.”); Orin
S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 576 (2009) (demonstrating the importance of third-party doctrine for criminal investigations). For a discussion of
how courts have transformed Fourth Amendment doctrine in response to technology, see
Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored E-mail, 2008 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 121, 177 (concluding that Fourth Amendment warrant-level protection is
required to safeguard reasonable expectation of privacy); Alexander Tsesis, The Right to
Erasure: Privacy, Data Brokers, and the Indefinite Retention of Data, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 433,
458 (2014) (“Some police departments pay cell phone carriers from several hundred to
more than two thousand dollars to record and turn over the whereabouts of investigation
suspects’ cell signals.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-4\NDL403.txt

1610

unknown

Seq: 26

notre dame law review

5-JUN-19

9:37

[vol. 94:4

Europe, where judges review laws to decide “whether the means . . .
employ[ed] to achieve the aim correspond to the importance of the aim and
whether they are necessary for its achievement.”123 In the United States,
accurate and informative commercial speech calls for balanced intermediate
review,124 but much of internet content misleads consumers rather than
informing them. Internet commercial speech differs from traditional advertising. Typically, commercial speech proposes a commercial transaction.125
Social media companies do just that. Their proposal for commercial transaction is to provide informational and associational service in exchange for the
commodification of private consumer data. The extent to which commercial
speech is being used to harvest personal information is unprecedented and
requires expanding the definition of commercial speech not only to proposals for commercial transaction but also to commercial transactions that harvest consumers’ data for resale to third parties and for algorithmic
extraction.
Part III discusses the extent to which consumer privacy is compromised
and advocates for judicial review capable of reining in commercial harvesting
of unconsented data mining. False political advertisement, however, should
be treated differently, subject to the actual malice standard for public officials and traditional libel laws from private parties. This dichotomy recognizes the lower value of commercial speech and the political value of even
misleading messages.
A.

Commercial Data Exploitation

Contemporary data storage companies hold vast amounts of personal
data. Perhaps the foremost of these firms is the giant Acxiom, which as far
back as 2009 had 1500 data points “on every American.”126 The company’s
“database contain[ed] information about 500 million active consumers
worldwide.”127 While the human brain forgets, the corporate memory lives
on to perpetuity. Firms freely market truthful, credible, pertinent, and useful
information. But marketing is not always a transparent art, and it certainly
does not always supply useful information as the truth model supposed.
Commercial transactions in psychometrics that are based on personality traits
(or in technical jargon, “private data”) are motivated by profit.128 Therefore,
123 TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 139 (2d ed. 2006).
124 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 573 (1980).
125 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761
(1976).
126 Stephanie Clifford, Ads Follow Web Users, and Get More Personal, N.Y. TIMES (July 30,
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/business/media/31privacy.html.
127 Natasha Singer, Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome, N.Y. TIMES (June 16,
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/technology/acxiom-the-quiet-giant-of-consumer-database-marketing.html.
128 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal,
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 810 (discussing normative functions of audience protections);
Rebecca Tushnet, Attention Must Be Paid: Commercial Speech, User-Generated Ads, and the Chal-
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the four-part test from Central Hudson applies, as it does in all reviews of commercial speech.129 The same does not hold true for misleading noncommercial speech.
The assumption that audiences can intelligently evaluate information
and eventually identify what is truthful is an idealistic presumption that does
not bear out in reality.130 Misleading speech does not even get over the first
part of the Central Hudson test. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court
finds that “[i]f the speech does not pass this preliminary threshold, then it is
not protected by the First Amendment at all.”131 Online falsehood can
spread broadly and rapidly. Unlike traditional media, Facebook, Twitter, and
other services make it easy to create fake accounts that manipulate an audience’s access to information and thereby undermine citizens’ ability to identify the accuracy of their browsing experiences,132 further eroding the
marketplace of ideas analogy’s relevance to misleading internet expression.
On the commercial side, online ads offer links that are created to
encourage impulsive purchases, not the well-conceived consumer choices
presumed in the commercial speech doctrine.133 The internet increases the
available audience size for savvy marketers, which are not necessarily those
with the best-quality or best-priced products. Consumers, therefore, are saddled with adhesive privacy policies, subject to perpetual retention of their
data, and given no serious transparency—much less recourse—against social
lenge of Regulation, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 721, 730 (2010) (“Given an audience-focused justification for commercial speech doctrine, audiences’ dogged attempts to evade or ignore
advertising suggest that even if audiences have rights to receive desired information that the
state would prefer to suppress, such rights can’t support an advertiser’s claim of a right to
provide information in which consumers have expressed no interest.”).
129 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566 (“At the outset, we must determine
whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to
come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.”). On the most recent hints of judicial change away from the Central
Hudson test, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
130 See Lidsky, supra note 128, at 815 (“[A]ny number of First Amendment doctrines
rely on a model of the audience as rational, skeptical, and capable of sorting through
masses of information to find truth.”).
131 City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 434 (1993).
132 See Andrew Hasty, Note, Treating Consumer Data Like Oil: How Re-framing Digital Interactions Might Bolster the Federal Trade Commission’s New Privacy Framework, 67 FED. COMM. L.J.
293 (2015); M.T. Wroblewski, Examples of Manipulative Advertising, HOUS. CHRON. (Nov. 28
2018), http://smallbusiness.chron.com/examples-manipulative-advertising-11668.html;
Kit Yarrow, The Science of How Marketers (and Politicians) Manipulate Us, TIME: MONEY (Sept.
29, 2016), http://time.com/money/4511709/marketing-politicians-manipulation-psychology/.
133 See Thomas R. Lee et al., Trademarks, Consumer Psychology, and the Sophisticated Consumer, 57 EMORY L.J. 575, 609 (2008).
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media trade in their personal metrics. In the meantime, an industry whose
valuation is well over three trillion dollars a year134 goes largely unregulated.
Moreover, in a digital world, advertisers not only disseminate information to customers, they also gather data about them. The cookies that
become embedded on computers after consumers visit certain websites can
benefit those same consumers by speeding up retrieval of relevant and helpful information. However, they also allow companies to amass profiles of customers and ordinary visitors on their websites and then to retrieve them
through JavaScript software.135 The main beneficiaries of advertisement
retrieval software are not audiences but advertisers, social media companies,
the data mining firms, or political marketers.
One of the most effective internet campaigns of public misinformation
occurred in 2016, when Russian intelligence services disseminated propaganda about Hillary Clinton, pilfered Democratic Party emails, and sent
targeted audiences fake news stories meant to boost support for
then–presidential candidate Donald Trump and presidential primary candidate Bernie Sanders. The U.S. intelligence services—specifically the FBI,
CIA, and NSA—found that Russian intelligence services hacked a Democratic Party email server. WikiLeaks later very likely disseminated those documents, becoming, in the view of the FBI and CIA directors, either an
advertent or inadvertent agent of the Russian Intelligence Services.136
Businesses like Cambridge Analytica (CA) specialize in harvesting digital
profiles and using them to direct political advertisements to susceptible audiences. CA obtained data from subjects who voluntarily downloaded an app
and provided private details, through misleading fronting that they were
meant for an academic study. CA then accessed demographic information of
eighty-seven million Facebook profiles to better tailor its messages and
increase the effectiveness of its political marketing scheme.137 Even if CA
destroyed its datasets, there is reason to be concerned; Facebook indefinitely
retains the originals to monetize at its discretion.138
134 Market Capitalization of the Biggest Internet Companies Worldwide as of May 2018 (in Billion U.S. Dollars), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/277483/market-value-of-thelargest-internet-companies-worldwide/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
135 Tsesis, supra note 122, at 437–38.
136 See Ellen Nakashima et al., A German Hacker Offers a Rare Look Inside the Secretive World
of Julian Assange and WikiLeaks, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/world/national-security/a-german-hacker-offers-a-rare-look-inside-the-secretiveworld-of-julian-assange-and-wikileaks/2018/01/17/e6211180-f311-11e7-b390-a36dc3fa2842
_story.html?utm_term=.8769cc6aa8e2; Kathryn Watson, How Did WikiLeaks Become Associated with Russia?, CBS NEWS (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-did-wiki
leaks-become-associated-with-russia/.
137 See Craig Timberg et al., Facebook: ‘Malicious Actors’ Used Its Tools to Discover Identities
and Collect Data on a Massive Global Scale, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04/04/facebook-said-the-personal-data-ofmost-its-2-billion-users-has-been-collected-and-shared-with-outsiders/.
138 See Jane Wakefield, Is Leaving Facebook the Only Way To Protect Your Data?, BBC (Mar.
20, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-43469656.
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Under current U.S. law, Facebook may be liable for violating a 2011 consent decree for divulging eighty-seven million friendship profiles to the
researcher who eventually shared them with CA.139 As social media companies have grown wealthier by offering new products in exchange for personal
information, they remain largely unaccountable for the enormous stores of
information amassed on their servers. Any legislative attempt to limit social
media companies will face Supreme Court doctrines that increasingly favor
economic interests over the private concerns of individuals.140 In the case of
inflammatory statements made with actual malice, there is reason to rethink
U.S. reliance on the marketplace of ideas to police itself. False political
advertisements have been used to subvert the democratic process by saturating the marketplace of ideas with false propaganda that instigates violence, as
it has in such countries as Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Libya, India, Myanmar, and
Mexico.141 The problem becomes increasingly acute as Facebook displaces
local media, with news stories imputing the reputations of identifiable groups
like Jews, African Americans, Muslims, and members of the LGBTQ community going viral on social media and being taken up by violent organizations
seeking to harm the specters of their animus.
B.

Judicial Review of False and Misleading Advertisements

The commercial speech doctrine assumes that advertisers will provide
audiences with useful information. This in turn is thought to benefit the
marketplace of ideas. But commercial speech does not always encourage
thought and inspection. Rather, through repetition and exploitation of cognitive biases, which companies identify through algorithmic analyses, it elicits
interests for brands through social imagery (call them “bells and whistles”)
rather than provides listeners with objective and informative truths about
products.142
Typical consumer protection laws, which aim to prevent misrepresentation and material disclosures to protect audiences, are inadequate to deal
139 See Cecilia Kang, Facebook Fine Could Total Billions if F.T.C. Talks Lead to a Deal, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/technology/facebook-ftcsettlement.html; Donie O’Sullivan, Scientist at Center of Data Controversy Says Facebook Is Making Him a Scapegoat, CNN (Mar. 20, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/03/20/technology/aleksandr-kogan-interview/index.html.
140 See Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133.
141 See Alexander Tsesis, Essay, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. 651, 656
(2017); Libby Hogan & Michael Safi, Revealed: Facebook Hate Speech Exploded in Myanmar
During Rohingya Crisis, GUARDIAN (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2018/apr/03/revealed-facebook-hate-speech-exploded-in-myanmar-during-rohingya-crisis;
Amanda Taub & Max Fisher, Where Countries Are Tinderboxes and Facebook Is a Match, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/21/world/asia/facebook-srilanka-riots.html; Declan Walsh & Suliman Ali Zway, A Facebook War: Libyans Battle on the
Streets and on Screens, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/
world/middleeast/libya-facebook.html.
142 See Doris Estelle Long, Is Fame All There Is? Beating Global Monopolists at Their Own
Marketing Game, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 123, 136 (2008).
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with the digital platforms’ uses of manipulative pricing discriminations
informed by a wide range of past consumer behavior across various digital
platforms.143 While many data subjects find it convenient to receive targeted
commercial advice and tailored political advertisements, algorithmic data
processing often skews results, serving the interests of commercial and political entities, not the audiences’ search for information.
Under these circumstances, courts should not rely on the heightened
First Amendment scrutiny to review the regulation of misleading manipulative data acquired without explicit consumer consent, which at best has a
minimum value to consumers. Indeed, much of it is not advertisement delivery but data acquisition and sale. Social media companies are subject to ordinary commercial regulation, with no intermediate scrutiny requirement,
when they falsely claim to solely be platforms for information but actually
exploit their market strength to trade in limitless private data. Social media
companies based in the United States—such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter—can be limited in the for-profit aspects of their business. Intermediate
scrutiny applies to their advertisements. But exchange in private data should
be governed by reasonable commercial regulation.144 Regulation of the
internet communication is subject to heightened scrutiny because it involves
speech. But regulations of it should be subject to intermediate scrutiny
because the World Wide Web is neither a purely commercial nor a purely
speech platform. Part IV of this Article will argue that reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions can be made on the duration of data
retention.
The Court has been clear that misleading commercial speech is not protected by the First Amendment.145 Regulations that control only misleading
commercial statements should receive rational basis scrutiny. In this category
are laws governing lending, where internet service companies track, rather
than inform, customers using online behavioral advertising.146 The Federal
Trade Commission Act (FTCA) specifically prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts
or practices.”147 Just as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has found that
the unintentional release of consumer names and email addresses linked to
medical care can be unfair and deceptive,148 so too should the purposeful
failure to inform consumers of the extent social media companies share consumers’ private information with third-party vendors. Three-quarters of
143 See Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 190
(2017).
144 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 596 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“The fact that the Court normally exempts the regulation of ‘misleading’ and ‘deceptive’
information even from the rigors of its ‘intermediate’ commercial speech scrutiny testifies
to the importance of securing ‘unbiased information.’”).
145 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2382 (2018); In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
146 See Alan L. Friel, Managing Risk from Advertising and Sales Promotions, INTELL. PROP. &
TECH. L.J., Feb. 2012, at 3, 5–6.
147 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
148 Eli Lilly & Co., 133 F.T.C. 763 (2002) (consent order).
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Americans, as a study relying on data from 543 subjects found, do not even
read privacy statements.149 The Global Privacy Enforcement Network, a multinational information privacy task force, found that about a fourth of privacy
statements lacked adequate indication of what personal data was been collected; sixty-five percent lacked a statement about what protections were used
to maintain privacy; and about seventy percent of policy statements failed to
indicate what country data would be stored in, making it impossible for users
to know what law(s) would apply.150 In the United States, a national law
should be passed that “[a]llow[s] consumers the right to request a business
to disclose the categories and specific pieces of personal information that the
business has collected about the consumers as well as the source of that information and business purpose for collecting the information.”151
In identifying factors that mislead consumers, courts can look to the
FTC’s fair information practices, which require adequate “[n]otice, [c]hoice,
[a]ccess, and [s]ecurity.”152 But the judiciary’s role is of greater consequence than that of the FTC, which only prosecutes cases of companies failing to live up to their own privacy statements.153 Judges should look to
whether privacy statements allowing for blanket use of private data are so
ambiguous as to result in consumer confusion capitalized up by firms to sell
intimate information to which data subjects did not directly consent.
Political data, however, is different. With that type of communication,
even false information can have some value to vigorous discussion on public
issues.154 First Amendment jurisprudence recognizes the importance to representative government of being free to criticize or support political positions. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan identified a standard for regulating
defamatory speech about how public servants carry out their official
149 Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on the Internet: Ignoring the
Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking Services, INFO., COMMC’N &
SOC’Y, July 2018, at 1, 8.
150 Privacy Statement Deficiencies Could Have Greater Consequences in 2018, MAYNARD
COOPER & GALE, https://www.maynardcooper.com/blog/privacy-statement-deficienciescould-have-greater-consequences-2018 (last visited Jan. 23, 2019).
151 State Laws Related to Internet Privacy, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 7, 2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/statelaws-related-to-internet-privacy.aspx (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–.198); see also CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 1798.83–.84 (West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-37-201–03 (West 2018).
152 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, at i (2000) [hereinafter FTC PRIVACY
ONLINE REPORT], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-on
line-fair-information-practices-electronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commission-report/pri
vacy2000.pdf .
153 See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 599, 628–29 (2014).
154 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964) (stating that First
Amendment values do not only apply to true statements and adding “[t]hat erroneous
statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive’” (quoting
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
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duties.155 That case arose from a lawsuit filed by the supervisor of the Montgomery, Alabama, police department, whom a civil rights organization criticized for refusing to comply with desegregation orders.156 The
advertisement critical of the department’s treatment of a civil rights matter
contained a number of mistakes.157
Supervisor Sullivan was neither mentioned in the advertisement, nor
could he show evidence of suffering harm.158 Nevertheless, the jury
returned a verdict awarding him a half million dollars in damages. The
Supreme Court overturned that verdict and established a far-reaching rule.
It held that a public official bringing a lawsuit for damages incurred from a
statement about the performance of official duties show with convincing clarity that the speaker acted with knowledge or with reckless disregard of the
statement’s falsity.159 The Sullivan Court recognized that defamation can
provide relief from false statements that harm an individual’s reputation.160
Yet it overturned the jury verdict because of a higher principle at play.
Public debate on and off the internet is so essential to deliberative
democracy that even erroneous statements harming a public servant’s reputation must be tolerated absent actual malice.161 Moreover, even outside the
defamation context, discussing controversial subjects inevitably causes discomfort and even emotional pain, but these are not reasons for silencing
individuals on the internet. Political conflicts tend to be heated and given to
hyperbole or understatement, some of them demonstrably false. The importance of open and frank discussions is of such high consequence to the
proper functioning of representative politics that “occasional injury to the
155 Id.
156 Id. at 256–57. To view the advertisement see Heed Their Rising Voices, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 1960, at L25.
157 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 258 (“It is uncontroverted that some of the statements contained in the two paragraphs were not accurate descriptions of events which occurred in
Montgomery.”); id. at 258–59 (listing discrepancies between the ad and events of desegregation protests).
158 Id. at 294 (Black, J., concurring).
159 Id. at 279–80 (majority opinion) (“The constitutional guarantees require, we think,
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with
‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.”); id. at 285–86 (“[W]e consider that the proof presented to
show actual malice lacks the convincing clarity which the constitutional standard
demands.”).
160 Id. at 267 (stating that the defendant’s “privilege of ‘fair comment’ for expressions
of opinion depends on the truth of the facts upon which the comment is based”).
161 See Caldwell v. Caldwell, 545 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 2008) (“An interest in
informed participation in public discourse is one we hold in common as citizens in a
democracy.”); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 711 (6th Cir. 2002) (“A true
democracy is one that operates on faith—faith that government officials are forthcoming
and honest, and faith that informed citizens will arrive at logical conclusions.”).
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reputations of individuals must yield to the public welfare.”162 This mode of
reasoning and the rule from Sullivan has some troubling implications for
politics. Under current doctrine, the Court is likely to strike down any legislation seeking to regulate purely political speech, especially if it limits communication about public officials and public matters.163 And it is worth
putting such protections of speech but not shirking from regulating actually
malicious falsehoods that deceive the electorate as they did during the 2016
presidential election. That is, even in compelling speech matters there are
countervailing considerations, such as fair elections that can advance compelling government reasons and are narrowly tailored.
However, where incitement or true threats are called for, the actual malice test is inapplicable, nor is that expression covered by the First Amendment. Under the latter circumstances, either the Brandenburg v. Ohio test,164
with its imminent threat of harm component, or the Virginia v. Black true
threats test applies.165
The Court is unlikely to revisit the issues anytime soon despite the
profound effect false political speech had on the 2016 election. Political
speech, even when misleading but not actually malicious, remains protected
by the First Amendment when dealing with public matters and public concerns. Public debates about federal and state matters require freedom from
government intrusions. Free speech principles prevent the stifling of open
debate about democratic institutions and actors. The internet is a network
for the free exchange of ideas. Working out complex social, cultural, and
political issues is a step to finding the truth about how to make legal changes
needed that better serve the general welfare. Yet, when internet firms receive
notices complaining of deliberate falsehoods, they should investigate with
the help of natural humans, capable of making nuanced semantic and syntactic evaluations.
U.S. free speech law amply protects the marketplace of digital ideas.
Nevertheless, while voting rights are fundamental, states can regulate them
through fair and efficient legislation designed to maintain the integrity of
elections.166 Federal action is warranted and legitimate where social media
and other internet intermediaries have been notified that they are carrying
misleading information about elections, and fail to investigate and take it
down. Hence, posts can be regulated and enjoined when they mislead voters
of the date of the election, falsely identify locations of voting booths, misstate
162 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 281 (quoting Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 286 (Kan.
1908)).
163 The Court has found corporations have First Amendment rights. See First Nat’l
Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784–85 (1978).
164 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
165 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359, 364–65 (2003).
166 See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (“[T]o subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a
compelling state interest, as petitioner suggests, would tie the hands of States seeking to
assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently.”).
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candidates’ official affiliation, or falsify information about the order on the
official ballot, and so forth. As discussed in Part IV, changes should be made
to the current state in internet firm immunity to hold them accountable for
being complicit in knowingly misleading the public about commercial or
political information.
IV. REGULATING RETENTION

OF

DATA

Democratic societies function best in a market where divergent political
and personal opinions can thrive. The spread of divisive information can, on
the other hand, divide citizens by racist, sexist, and xenophobic rhetoric that
shifts the marketplace of ideas away from rational, scientific, and artistic
expression.167 Unlike government, commercial outlets need not operate for
the general welfare. Profit-driven internet businesses are important to the
economy, but a for-profit corporation need not spend resources to address
political problems or advance equal opportunity. Indeed, at times commercial institutions sow false discourse, as when corporations seek to deceive
about health risks and climate change in order to advance commercial
tobacco and energy interests.168 With advertisements, government has an
important interest in enforcing carefully crafted laws requiring accurate commercial information.169 Algorithmic models help marketers profit and customers gain valuable knowledge about matters such as price and store
location. However, commercial information does little to advance democratic deliberation, personal autonomy, or objective knowledge.170
As matters stand in the United States, social media companies are
immune from liability even when they knowingly host false or misleading
advertisements on their platform to which they did not contribute. Congress
should modify the immunity statute, section 230, which is discussed in Section IV.B, to put regulatory responsibility on multibillion-dollar corporations
to better police their networks against false and misleading advertisements or
to face large monetary penalties.
A.

False and Misleading Digital Messages

Internet firms develop, modify, and improve algorithms in order to
improve their products. A corporation’s obligation is to increase profits for
its stockholders.171 Thus, optimizing search and website content is for the
167 See Paul Przybylski, Note, A Common Tool for Individual Solutions: Why Countries Should
Establish an International Organization to Regulate Internet Content, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
927, 936 (2007).
168 See generally NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A
HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL
WARMING (2011).
169 See supra notes 157–59 and accompanying text.
170 For a detailed study about the various constitutional theories of free speech, see
Tsesis, supra note 27.
171 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
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advancement of capitalistic motives, rather than the truth.172 Information
thereby analyzed and generated through artificial intelligence tools enables
firms to tailor and target product information to receptive audiences. Insofar as the information is in the interest of consumers, the data serves the
marketplace of ideas. Digital algorithmic learning has proven to be highly
profitable. In addition to commercial products, such algorithmic systems
have helped countless people find all manner of curiosities and news online
that stimulate self-expression or political discourse. But to the extent that
algorithms skew and manipulate digital traffic, their value for advancing
truth is low.173
There are also abundant risks with an unregulated marketplace populated with firms seeking to cash in by using consumer profiles to manipulate
their political behaviors. The rate of digital advancement poses one of the
greatest hurdles for policymakers seeking to control the spread of “fake
news.” Norms protecting consumers already exist, but they are underenforced. The Federal Trade Commission has long accepted Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPP), which require data collectors to provide
consumers with “clear and conspicuous notice of their information practices,
including what information they collect, [and] how they collect it.”174 That
standard has proved inadequate, however, because firms’ disclosures are typically so broad and vague that they provide audiences inadequate control over
the information they divulge to social media corporations in exchange for
digital services. The lack of transparency arguably violates the FIPP’s guidance to clearly identify “any potential recipients of the data.”175 Consumers
are usually left in a black box of unknowability of whom their data is being
harvested to and how long it is being stored. Greater regulatory oversight is
needed to protect users’ privacy and control over data. Facebook, for
instance, should not have been left immune from liability for the havoc,
fraud, and privacy breaches it facilitated during the 2016 U.S. presidential
election.176 It became a platform for misleading information, profiting from
172 AMY N. LANGVILLE & CARL D. MEYER, GOOGLE’S PAGERANK AND BEYOND 28 (2006).
173 Elizabeth E. Joh, Private Security Robots, Artificial Intelligence, and Deadly Force, 51 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 569, 583–84 (2017).
174 FTC PRIVACY ONLINE REPORT, supra note 152; Fair Information Practice Principles, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, https://web.archive.org/web/20090331134113/http://www.ftc.gov/
reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm (last modified June 25, 2007). The “five core principles of
privacy protection: (1) Notice/Awareness; (2) Choice/Consent; (3) Access/Participation;
(4) Integrity/Security; and (5) Enforcement/Redress.” Id.
175 Id.
176 Facebook also has data partnerships for personal data being shared with companies
like Apple, Samsung, and Amazon. Nicholas Confessore et al., Facebook Back on the Defensive, Now Over Data Deals with Device Makers, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes
.com/2018/06/04/technology/facebook-device-partnerships-criticized.html. Moreover,
Facebook has shared information with Chinese companies, including one (Huawei) with
close relations to the Chinese autocracy. Michael LaForgia & Gabriel J.X. Dance, Facebook
Gave Data Access to Chinese Firm Flagged by U.S. Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2018), https:/
/www.nytimes.com/2018/06/05/technology/facebook-device-partnerships-china.html.
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deception, aware but not informing customers whose information had been
divulged to Cambridge Analytica.177 Later in this Article, I will explain
changes to U.S. law that could have made such prosecution possible.
Ideally, consumer policy should cover a breadth of intrusive online
behaviors through self-help civil actions and government prosecutions. To
systematically deal with internet firms’ continuous and clandestine gathering
of private metrics, a legal threshold should be established delimiting the
duration that a marketer can retain personalized data. The monitoring technologies are meant to shape human behavior, not as steps to social truths or
personal revelations, but for profit. As commercial speech, intermediate
scrutiny should enable courts to balance the interests of government and
private party, protect the due process sufficient for fair adjudication, and provide a mechanism for redress, such as a contextually sound injunction of the
case or controversy. Where restrictions are made on commercial vendors disseminating false political speech or journalism, better known as “fake news,”
an actual malice standard should apply to better protect controversial public
statements.
Given internet companies’ substantial effects on interstate economy,
Congress can rely on Commerce Clause authority to penalize firms that use
their market power to manipulate searches that, in the end, prevent consumers from viewing the full breadth of useful information.178 The manipulation of search engine results, for instance, tends to produce more
consumerist speech that favors dominant commercial speakers who seek to
sell their products rather than provide objective, truthful information to consumers.179 Moreover, regulation should be used to limit the length of time
for which a merchant can retain data and prohibit the resale of data to thirdparty businesses not engaged in enterprises directly related to the original
service. The idea is to maintain consent and control in the hands of consumers, rather than those of data marketers.
Currently, internet information providers are for the most part shielded
from liability by the Communication Decency Act’s safe harbor provision.180
Facebook, Google, Twitter, and YouTube can shield themselves behind the
law from liability for false material, exploitative content, misinformation,

177 Anthony Cuthbertson, Facebook Knew About Cambridge Analytica Data Breach a Year
Before Trump Election, INDEPENDENT (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/
business/news/facebook-cambridge-analytica-trump-election-data-breach-mark-zucker
berg-a8292071.html.
178 ALBERT-LÁSZLÓ BARABÁSI, LINKED: HOW EVERYTHING IS CONNECTED TO EVERYTHING
ELSE AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR BUSINESS, SCIENCE, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 44 (2002) (finding a
“complete absence of democracy, fairness, and egalitarian values on the Web” that “prevents
us from seeing anything but a mere handful of the billion documents out there”).
179 See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1165–67 (2008).
180 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
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propaganda, and malicious fake news.181 Advertisements do not always benefit consumers. Advertisers principally sell products, not engage in what has
traditionally been thought to be the marketplace of ideas.
The Supreme Court has recognized that false and deceitful advertisement does not fall within the ambit of First Amendment protections. Digital
misinformation about politics and products is unprotected by the commercial speech doctrine. In Central Hudson, the Court found the Free Speech
Clause protects those advertisements that inform the public, but not those
that are false and misleading.182
Even when websites provide visitor numbers, with which they seek to
demonstrate popularity, their definitions are problematic. About fifty-two
percent of internet traffic is generated by bots, not natural people.183 Tim
Wu explains that “bots pose as humans on Facebook, Twitter, and other
social media, and they transmit messages as directed” including hundreds of
millions of governmental and private-actor posts.184 Their influence on
internet traffic should not be understated with the extent to which private
parties and governments use them to spread false information and propaganda,185 which diminishes the value of the internet to the marketplace of
ideas. Some bots disseminate foreign propaganda to which only rational
basis scrutiny applies because of the national defense concerns they
invoke.186 On the commercial side, there are social benefits of truthful information and harms from misleading and manipulative speech. In neither
case are they part of the marketplace for truth as it has been defined in First
Amendment jurisprudence. Bot messaging is rather a technical tool for
181 See Julia Carrie Wong, Former Facebook Executive: Social Media Is Ripping Society Apart,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/dec/11/
facebook-former-executive-ripping-society-apart.
182 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64
(1980).
183 Adrienne LaFrance, The Internet Is Mostly Bots, ATLANTIC (Jan. 31, 2017), https://
www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/01/bots-bots-bots/515043/.
184 Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Sept. 2017),
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/tim-wu-first-amendment-obsolete.
185 See Alex Hern, Facebook and Twitter Are Being Used to Manipulate Public Opinion—
Report, GUARDIAN (June 19, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/
19/social-media-proganda-manipulating-public-opinion-bots-accounts-facebook-twitter;
Timothy Tam, How Bots Are Manipulating Cryptocurrency Prices, VENTUREBEAT (Dec. 14,
2017), https://venturebeat.com/2017/12/14/how-bots-are-manipulating-cryptocurrencyprices/.
186 DANIEL FRIED & ALINA POLYAKOVA, ATL. COUNCIL, DEMOCRATIC DEFENSE AGAINST
INFORMATION 4 (2018), https://disinfoportal.org/wp-content/uploads/ReportPDF/Democratic-Defense-Against-Disinformation.pdf (“Russian manipulation of social media utilizes
unattributed political ads or officially organized bots, trolls, cyborgs (human/bot combinations), and other means of mounting and masking disinformation campaigns.“); Robert
Gorwa, Computational Propaganda in Russia: The Origins of Digital Misinformation, OXFORD
INTERNET INST., https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/blog/computational-propaganda-in-russia-theorigins-of-digital-misinformation/ (discussing Russian propaganda methods, including the
use of bots, to manipulate social media information by exploiting internet architecture).
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exaggerating, generating such an overwhelming amount of false information
to silence countervoices, and thereby confusing the public. Robotic messaging can be used to attack deliberative democracy’s administrative tools.
“[U]nder the existing jurisprudence, it seems that little—other than political
norms that are fast eroding—stands in the way of a full-blown campaign
designed to manipulate the political speech environment to the advantage of
current officeholders.”187 An Association of National Advertisers’ report
found: “Sophisticated bots moved the mouse, making sure to move the cursor over ads. Bots put items in shopping carts and visited many sites to generate histories and cookies to appear more demographically appealing to
advertisers and publishers.”188 Social media websites drive up advertisement
costs by reporting earnings based on inflated reports about internet
traffic.189
In addition to their commercial use, bots spread political messages.
Some of those posts are racially charged, as during the 2016 presidential election or the 2017 Virginia gubernatorial race, to impact elections and product
sales.190 Many target data profiles based on algorithmically identified biases
and vulnerabilities. Messages target individuals who are most often unaware
they have been profiled.191 Analytics companies, such as Cambridge
Analytica, earn enormous revenues by using psychometrics to understand
commercial and civic behaviors. They then compose and transmit emotive
and manipulative commercials in order to alter people’s beliefs and behaviors.192 As one author disturbingly put it: “[C]an you imagine what Hitler
would have done with access to Facebook data on tens of millions of
people?”193
187
188

Wu, supra note 184.
WHITE OPS, INC. & ASS’N OF NAT’L ADVERTISERS, THE BOT BASELINE: FRAUD IN DIGITAL ADVERTISING 6 (2014), https://www.whiteops.com/hubfs/ANA_WO_Bot_Baseline_
2014-1.pdf?t=1505782715097.
189 See Michael Burgi, What’s Being Done to Rein in $7 Billion in Ad Fraud, ADWEEK (Feb.
21, 2016), https://www.adweek.com/brand-marketing/whats-being-done-rein-7-billion-adfraud-169743/.
190 See Kevin Robillard, Bots Stoke Racial Strife in Virginia Governor’s Race, POLITICO (Nov.
3, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/03/virginia-governors-race-bots-racialstrife-244534.
191 See Gabriel Gatehouse, Did Cambridge Analytica Play a Role in the EU Referendum?, BBC
NEWSNIGHT (June 27, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-40423629/did-cambridgeanalytica-play-a-role-in-the-eu-referendum.
192 See Justin Bariso, Facebook, Cambridge Analytica, and the Dark Side of Emotional Intelligence, INC. (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.inc.com/justin-bariso/facebook-cambridgeanalytica-dark-side-emotional-intelligence.html (“Among other things, Cambridge
Analytica aimed to help clients identify the emotional triggers of voters, so they could
motivate those voters to act.”). As a spokesman for Virginia’s Democratic Senator Mark
Warner put it: “What we saw during the 2016 presidential campaign was a consistent and
coordinated effort by trolls and bots to ‘flood the zone’ to manipulate the conversation on
social media.” Robillard, supra note 190.
193 Bariso, supra note 192.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-4\NDL403.txt

unknown

Seq: 39

5-JUN-19

9:37

2019] m a r k e t p l a c e o f i d e a s , p r i v a c y & t h e d i g i t a l a u d i e n c e 1623

Those who harvest the most data are multibillion-dollar social media
conglomerations. This is especially a concern with the spread of at-home
voice recognition devices, like Amazon’s Echo/Alexa commercial device, and
the growing presence of the Internet of Things. Further, Google and its popular YouTube service are not simply informative. They earn a percentage
from each click on an advertisement, irrespective of who accesses it.194
Facebook likewise earns revenues for each click on an advertisement.195
Facebook “likes” can be bought to harvest feed hits, and Twitter followers can
also be obtained for a price.196 Social media architecture is designed to benefit advertising, not strictly the marketing of commercially or politically beneficial data. By facilitating the dissemination of false advertisement and
generating inaccurate data, social media companies are often conduits to
frauds.
Despite the extent of deceptions, misinformation, and manipulation
being perpetrated over internet information providers’ websites, a provision
of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) prevents federal regulators or
private parties from filing suits against them. In relevant part, section 230 of
the CDA grants immunity to “provider[s] or user[s] of an interactive computer service” from liability for third-party content on the platforms.197
Judges have held platforms are immune even when they had notice that
defamatory content appeared on their websites but, nevertheless, refused to
eliminate it.198
B.

Section 230 Immunity

Section 230 applies to internet service providers who host third-party
content. The statute provides: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.”199 This has not only
achieved the stimulation of robust debates and artistic platforms—which for
good reason courts, legislators, and scholars favor200—but also the diminution of privacy. Under this current regime, internet service providers are
expected to police their own sites for offensive content, to self-regulate the
194 See Robert Cookson, Brands Versus Bots, FIN. TIMES (July 19, 2016), https://www.ft
.com/content/fb66c818-49a4-11e6-b387-64ab0a67014c; Eric Rosenberg, How Google Makes
Money (GOOG), INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/
investing/020515/business-google.asp.
195 See How Does Facebook Make Its Money?, BUS. MGMT. DEGREES, https://www.businessmanagement-degree.net/facebook/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2019).
196 See Doug Bock Clark, The Bot Bubble, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 20, 2015), https://perma
.cc/M33U-H5K2.
197 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
198 See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331–34 (4th Cir. 1997).
199 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
200 See, e.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 525 (Cal. 2006); Nicholas W. Bramble,
Safe Harbors and the National Information Infrastructure, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 325, 358 (2013);
Joseph Monaghan, Comment, Social Networking Websites’ Liability for User Illegality, 21 SETON
HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 499, 506 (2011).
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dissemination of personal data, to market user profiles, to target vulnerable
persons, to manipulate personality profiles, and to effectively remove it. By
passing the safe harbor provision, Congress aimed to protect internet information providers against litigation for simply screening, removing, or blocking materials that they in good faith believe to be “excessively violent . . . or
otherwise objectionable.”201 Social media companies have relied on this policy to avoid liability, even when their services encouraged illegal conduct.202
Only when a website materially contributes to illegal content does it lose its
immunity,203 allowing it to host unedited third-party posts with virtual
impunity.
Circuit courts have deferred to Congress’s reliance on corporate selfpolicing to uphold section 230 immunity.204 The approach overly relies on
internet companies to put in good faith efforts to monitor the marketplace of
ideas for illegality. The expectation is that firms will independently remove
false and misleading advertisements. Even if those companies could be
trusted to act effectively and consistently on that mission, it does not, at all,
get to the problem of countless privacy infringements so common in the digital realm. Companies enjoy immunity for harvesting audience profiles
through the use of digital technologies such as cookies, deep packet
searches, facial recognition technology, IP address selection, and internet
service protocols. These only have a tangential connection to spreading
truth in the marketplace of ideas. They primarily profit companies, who
then make corporate decisions, some of which deeply harm natural people’s
privacy.
Of late, scholars have questioned whether social media services are
merely distributors of content rather than information providers.205 Under
the current system, as Professor Danielle Citron and Benjamin Wittes have
pointed out, courts have granted immunity to a variety of internet platforms
even when those platforms intend to disseminate abuse and provide electronic forums for illegal conduct.206 They propose revision of section 230 to
subject those platforms to liability for the harms of defamation, revenge
201 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A); see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (“Congress enacted § 230 to
remove the disincentives to selfregulation . . . .”).
202 See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 401–03 (6th
Cir. 2014).
203 See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1167–70 (9th
Cir. 2008).
204 See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003); Green v. Am. Online, 318
F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2003); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980,
986 (10th Cir. 2000).
205 See Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569, 637–42 (2001); Sewali K. Patel,
Note, Immunizing Internet Service Providers from Third-Party Internet Defamation Claims: How Far
Should Courts Go?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 647, 651–53 (2002).
206 Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad
Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 408 (2017).
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porn, and other violations of trust that have no place in the marketplace of
ideas.207
Given the severity of privacy intrusion, lawmakers should modify section
230 to require internet companies to more effectively monitor their sites for
manipulatively false advertisements. Offenders should be subjected to prosecution. That includes monitoring foreign state entities who employ propaganda advertising on U.S. social media sites to influence American elections.
C.

Limiting Storage of Digital Data

Moreover, upon request, internet information providers should be
required to delete data from corporate servers once it is no longer needed to
advance the function for which they were originally posted.208 This policy
should hold for commercial advertisements and political psychometrics
aggregated by internet intermediaries. What is more, as with other news outlets social media companies should provide the FCC and consumers complete reports of how they market and use private information about persons
who use their websites or others connected to them. Privacy policy should be
governed by regulatory oversight, not corporate initiatives. A modified Communication Decency Act or, in the alternative, a new federal statute should
allow the Justice Department and private consumers to file civil lawsuits
against internet offenders, maintaining a rational basis test for misleading
and false commercial advertisements.
Under current U.S. laws, data mining is lawful, but without consumer
control over their digital profiles, intimate details can be resold indefinitely
without clear consent to those commercial transactions. The corporate
agglomeration of commercial digital data should be dealt with at the congressional level because it requires collective action policy.209 Internet services entice users to divulge private information by offering them helpful,
entertaining, political, and generally fascinating services. There is little consent where the information digital companies provide is misleading about
resale to third parties and about permanent retention.
A model already exists that can provide guidance to U.S. lawmakers.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union establishes a
standard that limits internet information companies’ retention and processing of data for the “specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the
person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law.”210 The
European Data Protection Directive of 1995 then obligated EU member
states to prohibit dissemination of personal data unless they first obtain the
207 Id. at 417–18.
208 This would be in keeping with EU law, which limits the duration for which social
media providers can retain personal information to the period needed to advance “specified, explicit and legitimate purposes.” Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 77, at 31, 40.
209 See NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 595 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Congress’
intervention was needed to overcome this collective-action impasse.”).
210 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, 2012 O.J. (C 326)
391.
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unambiguous consent for specific data processing, required to fulfill a contractual obligation, to abide by a legal duty, to protect the data subject’s vital
interests, or to perform a public function by an authorized official.211
The 1995 Directive was superseded by the EU General Data Protection
Regulation (“GDPR”) that now controls corporate use of digital data.212
Many facets of the older law remain. Under the GDPR, companies can only
control personal data for “specified, explicit and legitimate purposes.”213
There is a limit for how long data subjects’ information can be saved on
servers. This significantly limits internet companies’ abilities to commodify
ordinary people’s private details. Another GDPR provision protects listeners
against corporate internet firms’ resale of data to third parties: “Member
States law should reconcile the rules governing freedom of expression and
information, including journalistic, academic, artistic and or literary expression with the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to this Regulation.”214 Therefore, the length of time for which data can be retained does
not apply to parties engaged in the stated activities.
The GDPR is a law subject to EU free speech norms, which are not the
same as those in the United States. The U.S. Supreme Court tends to be
more protective of free speech than its European counterparts. But the
GDPR provides U.S. lawmakers with a framework for how long internet
intermediaries can retain information. Any new U.S. law must be in keeping
with Supreme Court commercial speech precedents. One important distinction is that instead of the European reasonableness test,215 American courts
should apply the intermediate scrutiny test to regulate commercial transactions between internet information intermediaries and consumers who
expose their personal data to the vendor. Congress has a substantial interest
in protecting consumers against the exploitation of their data without
explicit data subjects’ consent. Such a U.S. law should be narrowly tailored
to meet carefully crafted government policy that would enable commercial
entities to disseminate information and consumers to guard their private
data from permanent commercial exploitation.
D.

Fake News and Disinformation

In an age of such immense private data retention, the U.S. should join
Europe by adding consumer privacy regulations of the internet to better preserve natural persons’ fundamental rights to dignity, autonomy, and privacy.216 In January 2018, the European Commission (EC) convened a highlevel group of experts to address the growing phenomenon of “fake news and
211 Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 77, at 46.
212 GDPR, supra note 4, at 1, 35, art. 5(b).
213 Id.
214 Id. at 28, recital 153.
215 Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 77, at 40.
216 Id. at 38, art. 1 (“In accordance with this Directive, Member States shall protect the
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-4\NDL403.txt

unknown

Seq: 43

5-JUN-19

9:37

2019] m a r k e t p l a c e o f i d e a s , p r i v a c y & t h e d i g i t a l a u d i e n c e 1627

disinformation spread online.”217 The definition for fake news is very precise. The category does not include defamation, hate speech, or incitement
to violence. Rather, the EC enjoined the experts to concentrate on how to
combat “misleading information designed, presented and promoted to intentionally cause public harm or for profit.”218 Or, put into U.S. terms, the EC
addressed speech detrimental to the marketplace of ideas.
A group of experts created a report advising the EC to avoid censorship.
They proposed a dynamic process of identifying and addressing risks and
harms. The experts recommended a multifactoral analytical construct of
interconnected factors.219 They included a call for increased transparency,
promotion of literacy about media and information, user and journalist
empowerment “to tackle disinformation and foster a positive engagement
with fast-evolving information technologies,” maintaining multiplicity of news
sources, and engaging in future research.220 This thoughtful approach
offers a path toward dialogue conducive to consumers’ acquisition of useful,
artistic, philosophical, and political messages. In the meantime, issues such
as compromises of private computer servers, such as the 2016 presidential
campaign break-in and re-publication of the Democratic Party’s emails, will
need to be tackled more directly. Establishing think tanks with indefinite
time lines will help move the ball forward in the future, but the extent of
privacy breaches also requires immediate action. The threat of foreign interference in elections, for instance, is an immediate threat to democracy and
remote from the marketplace of ideas.
But the U.S. libertarian tradition to free speech makes moving U.S. law
in the direction of European balancing idealistic, rather than anything likely
to occur in the near future. In the short term, Congress should pass a law
pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority that will limit the length of time
for which internet firms can retain data, require firms to use an opt-in
option, and also modify section 230 of the Communications Decency Act to
remove immunity of merchants who save data without consent of users; who
disseminate it to third parties without consent of the data subject; who knowingly direct false and malicious information on their servers; and who maintain a data brokerage system without the express, transparent, and informed
consent of the data subjects.
CONCLUSION
Consumers benefit from truthful advertisements; however, digital platforms do not merely inform consumers. They are also harvesting intimate
217

EUROPEAN COMM’N, A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO DISINFORMATION: REPORT
INDEPENDENT HIGH LEVEL GROUP ON FAKE NEWS AND ONLINE DISINFORMATION 5
(2018), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-levelexpert-group-fake-news-and-online-disinformation.
218 Id. at 10.
219 For a discussion of multifactoral speech analysis, see Alexander Tsesis, Multifactoral
Free Speech, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1017 (2016).
220 EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 217, at 5.

OF THE
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details about their customers. What is more, the false advertisements available through platforms such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter threaten to
emotively manipulate consumer behavior. Distortion extends to the political
realm with manipulative search results and bot posts that threaten deliberative democracy. Facebook’s recent announcement that it will require political advertisers to reveal their identities will not be nearly enough to resolve
the problem.221 As the Supreme Court observed in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the First Amendment “does not disable the government from
taking steps to ensure that private interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway of communication, the free flow of information and
ideas.”222
Social media companies should not be self-regulated but should also not
be regulated under the framework of commercial regulations of digital platforms. Otherwise, digital platforms continue indefinitely retaining data subjects’ personal information long after completion of commercial
transactions. Digitally stored materials, then, not only remain available for
third-party transactions but also, unbeknownst to data subjects, susceptible to
third-party exploitation for purposes unrelated to the original transaction.
The Cambridge Analytica debacle appears to have been just that sort of snafu
in Facebook’s corporate plan, which cost at least eighty-seven million people
their privacy and manipulated the 2016 U.S. presidential race.223
Enforcing standards against fake commercial and political advertisements, whether under the guise of news reporting or for commercial products, is an important governmental interest that can be applied in a narrowly
tailored manner to benefit audiences, without stifling meaningful debate. It
should start with a statutory requirement that social media companies use
opt-in rather than opt-out requirements for divulging private users’ data.
Social media platforms that facilitate the dissemination of private information or false advertisements should be unable to hide behind the mantle of
section 230’s safe harbor provision. Without litigation, including discovery
proceedings, only social media programmers can identify whether the information intermediaries are aware that they are being enriched through false
advertisements.
Commerce Clause authority enables Congress to limit the duration for
which marketers can retain consumer data and limit the purposes for which
221 Tony Romm, Facebook’s New Rules Aim to Thwart the Kind of Ads Bought by Russian
Trolls During the Election, WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/technology/wp/2018/04/06/facebooks-new-rules-aim-to-thwart-the-kind-of-adsbought-by-russian-trolls-during-the-election (reporting that “Facebook will then require
entities that seek to purchase issues-based ads to first verify who they are and their location
offline”).
222 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 657 (1994).
223 See Cuthbertson, supra note 177; Jeet Heer, Fake News Isn’t the Problem, NEW REPUBLIC
(Nov. 18, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/article/138851/fake-news-isnt-problem; Craig
Silverman, This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News Stories Outperformed Real News on
Facebook, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-outperformed-real-news-on-facebook.
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internet intermediaries can use personally identifiable information, such as
persons’ finances, genders, political affiliations, shopping habits, racial or
ethnic characteristics, reading interests, and much more. For the internet
marketplace of ideas to function more efficiently, without consumer threat
from false and misleading messages, federal law should better regulate
internet intermediaries’ retention and dissemination of personal data.
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